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Foreword
9
Developed nations around the world are today grappling with
public policy challenges created by dramatic improvements in
life expectancy. Quite simply, people are living much longer than
previous generations and in greater numbers than ever before –
bringing the challenge of how we pay for these extra years to
individuals and governments.
With the number of UK citizens aged 85 and over forecast
to double between now and 2030 and 1.3 million people already
receiving social care services in England alone, social care
funding is a key public policy challenge. Against this backdrop
the Government has set in train a set of reforms designed to get
social care funding onto a sustainable footing, by establishing a
new level for what individuals and the state will pay. The reforms
are designed to encourage individuals to explore how best to use
their available wealth and assets to meet care costs through a
mixed economy of local authority and private sector care-
funding options.
The litmus test for the reform package will be the extent to
which it delivers a framework that prompts, encourages and
enables people to plan ahead. This was among the issues identif-
ied by the House of Lords Public Service and Demography
Committee, which warned that government and society are
‘woefully underprepared’ for the numbers of people requiring
social care in later life. Addressing this lack of awareness so that
people understand they have a responsibility to pay for some or
all of their social care services, how much these services cost, and
how the Government cap on these costs works in practice will be
crucial to the reforms’ success.
In writing Unlocking the Potential Demos, in collaboration
with Cass Business School, has engaged a wide range of
consumer, financial services, regulatory and policy experts to
seek fresh insights to inform the development of new options to
address obstacles individuals face when making financial
provisions for the costs in later life. The analysis draws on the
framework set out in the Care Bill and known consumer
behavioural traits, and develops recommendations to motivate
individuals to plan for their care funding well before the point of
need. The report also leverages one of the other key
recommendations made by the Lords Committee – utilising
housing wealth, and exploring how to enable people to pledge
housing equity towards their potential care costs in later life.
Just Retirement is delighted to have contributed to the
development of this report, making good the insurance
industry’s commitment to helping create new policy and
financial product options to address people’s needs in later life.
With the Care Bill expected to create a new framework by 2016
this is a timely and hugely important contribution to the debate.
Stephen Lowe, Group External Affairs Director
Just Retirement Group
Foreword
Executive summary
11
The passage through parliament of the Care and Support Bill
marks a watershed moment in the history of social care funding
in England. For the first time the costs of social care will be
capped for each individual, albeit with various exceptions and
caveats about which specific costs the cap includes.
This report explores what happens next. It argues that the
reforms are necessary, but not sufficient, to create a new culture
in which citizens forward plan for the costs of care in later life. It
examines what further steps policy makers might take to
encourage and enable people to plan ahead for care costs, and
considers the kind of private sector products that might
contribute to this.
The expectation among policy makers is that by capping
the lifetime costs of care, a new market will open up for long-
term care products, which enable people to meet their
obligations up to the level of the cap. As the Prime Minister has
put it, ‘It’s right to try and put in place a cap which will then
open up an enormous insurance market, so people can insure
against that sort of catastrophic loss.’2
However, there remain considerable demand-side barriers
to such a market emerging in the near future. The most
important of these is strikingly low public awareness of the
likelihood of needing care, of the potential costs of that care, and
of the division of responsibility for meeting those costs between
the state and the individual. The evidence suggests that people
tend to underestimate the chances of needing care and the cost of
it – and only a small minority understand how the care funding
system works. The danger, therefore, is that despite all the efforts
of policy makers to cap and clarify care costs, lack of good
information may prevent many people from planning ahead any
more than they did in the past.
In addition to this lack of public awareness, there may also
be strong behavioural barriers to people acting on the
information that they have. People tend to suffer from ‘optimism
bias’ – the tendency to overestimate the probability of desirable
things – and underestimate the probability of undesirable things.
Social care costs are likely to fall into this second category.
Furthermore, recent pensions policy provides a warning about
the risk that inertia will prevent people from acting even when
they have good information and the intention to put money
aside. The Government has decided the best strategy is to
capitalise on inertia, rather than seek to overcome it. Since 2013
employees at the largest UK companies have been automatically
enrolled into occupational pensions by law, with the ability to
opt out rather than being expected to opt in themselves.
The passing of the Care and Support Bill therefore
represents an opportunity for the Government to tell people
what they will be entitled to and expected to pay through a
concerted awareness-raising effort. Given the expectation that
the financial services industry will innovate in response to the
reforms and offer new long-term care products, it is also likely
that the industry will play some part in raising awareness in
order to demonstrate the value of its products. However, the
lesson from policy areas such as pensions is that government
information is not always enough to spur action on its own.
The Government should take a further step to encourage
people to at least consider how well prepared they are for care
costs in later life. We recommend that it institutes a financial
health check for everyone reaching the state pension age. Each
individual’s first withdrawal from the state pension should be
conditional on going through the health check, to ensure
universal participation in it. The health check would be advisory
and no more – people would still be left to make their own
choices – but it would be a useful ‘nudge’ to encourage people
to consider their assets, liabilities, planned future income and
possible future care needs. This health check would take the
form of an online tool, providing tailored feedback to individuals
based on their responses to a relatively small number of basic
questions, as well as offering prompts for next steps. This kind of
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tool should also provide easily digestible facts, covering the
likelihood of the individual requiring social care, the probable
costs, the division of responsibility between government and the
individual, and some broad-brush options for people to consider.
The Government should also explore the potential of
introducing a more personalised and extensive face-to-face
consultation with a financial expert, at an earlier age, when they
are still preparing for later life. People could be invited to go
through such a check at age 50.
The point here is to ensure that people understand – and
stop to consider – the likely costs of social care in later life. This
would be a major step forward in encouraging a culture of
forward planning so that, having understood their liability for
care costs, people can begin to assess their options in a
straightforward way. One significant barrier to engagement in
this respect is the complexity of the means test proposed in the
Government’s reforms. This complexity makes the system
difficult for people to understand, let alone use as a basis for
forward planning.
We propose that the Government should adopt a simpler
means test, which would eradicate the complicated formula for
‘equivalising’ assets and income, as well as the thresholds and
‘cliff edges’ that make it hard for people to predict what support
they can expect from the state. Our proposed, simplified system
works through establishing how many years in residential care an
individual could afford, based on a combined assessment of their
assets and income. If implemented, those who can afford to
shoulder a greater amount of their care costs would receive less
support from the Government. Under this proposal, people
would be reassessed annually so that as their assets deplete over
time – and they can afford fewer years of care in the future – they
receive more help from the state. The intention of this simplified
approach is to make forward planning easier for people.
If more people are to plan ahead for the costs of social care
they must first understand their liabilities and then be in a
position to assess their options. The risk is that, equipped with a
proper understanding of the liabilities they face, people may
choose to do nothing at all – or, worse, to deliberately run down
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their assets – because the state offers a safety net as a funder of
last resort through the means test.
The Government should therefore seek ways in which to
encourage and reward self-funding, and planning ahead for self-
funding. If enough extra people can be encouraged to self-fund,
or the same number can be encouraged to self-fund to a greater
degree, then it may be possible to make savings and to reward
those willing to take responsibility for their own care. This would
have a double benefit: first, it would bring new money into the
care system and improve care quality; second, it would reduce
the burden on the Government and taxpayers who will face the
material costs of meeting care services for a rapidly ageing
population.
We recommend two options for further exploration. The
first of these options is a savings model, with some similarities to
pensions. Under this model the Government would create ‘care
accounts’ in which individuals would store wealth in the form of
savings or housing equity. The funds in care accounts would be
reserved specifically for covering care costs and could not be
withdrawn without a financial penalty after a set age in people’s
lives, such as age 70.
The incentive for people to ring-fence, or store, funds in
these care accounts in this way would be that a proportion of the
funds in the account would be disregarded in calculations for the
Government’s means test for care costs. This policy would be
designed to reduce the moral hazard created by the means test,
in that it would reward people for setting money or housing
equity aside, rather than treating this as a reason for the
Government to offer less support.
The second option that we present for further exploration
is an insurance model. Under this model, the state would lower
the social care cap for anyone able to demonstrate, in advance,
that they will not require financial support through the means
test for social care. In this model the Government would reward
all those willing to make commitments in advance by reducing
the level of the care cap for those individuals. This reduction
would take the form of a percentage discount against the care
cap. In practice, to qualify for this ‘early-bird discount’ people
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would have to register the purchase of a long-term care product
such as insurance or a disability-linked annuity with HM
Revenue & Customs. Registered products would be kite-marked,
to confirm their status.
These two options could coexist, or be implemented
independently of one another, but both aim to reduce the moral
hazard currently created by the means test by rewarding
individuals willing to commit funds in advance to cover the
future costs of social care. Both also rely on encouraging a
greater degree of self-funding to cover the costs of the incentives
involved. We recommend that the Government should explore
the viability of these two options.
Finally, we explore the new types of products likely to
enable people to draw on their assets – housing wealth in
particular – and plan ahead for the costs of social care. We 
argue that the Government’s Universal Deferred Payment
Scheme will help people to draw on their assets, but not to plan
ahead for care, especially if that care is provided in a domiciliary
setting. On this point, we also argue that the opportunity exists
for innovation by the financial services industry – to look at
options that enable planning ahead and the use of housing
wealth to cover care costs, including while homeowners still live
in their homes.
We present one model for this concept, based on an 
equity-for-insurance deal. Under this model, individuals would
be able to insure against care costs up to the cap in exchange 
for a fixed proportion of their housing equity. By allowing
people to pay for insurance through housing equity rather than
cash, such products would allow individuals to hedge against 
the risk of high care costs, without having to sacrifice their
disposable income.
Any products engineered along these lines would need
certain safeguards built in, which we discuss. Government and
industry, meanwhile should continue to work together to remove
any supply-side barriers to insurance products based on the
concept of individuals insuring against costs up to the level of
the cap. Industry stakeholders are clear that some significant
obstacles remain in place. However, the Government’s ambition
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to enable products like this, offering individuals security and
peace of mind, will bring good results.
Executive summary
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Social care funding has long been the problem that governments
refused to confront. The last government produced a royal
commission and three major reports on the subject but no
significant policy changes. Cross-party talks have frequently
been sought and always broken down.
In particular, governments have been unwilling to 
address the role of housing wealth in care funding. An ageing
population has placed growing strains on public funding for
care, while those aged 65 or over now hold an estimated £750
billion of unmortgaged housing equity.3 Yet the cultural
attachment to housing in the UK and the desire of people to
pass something on to their children has made linking these two
things politically toxic. A row over the so-called ‘death tax’, New
Labour’s final policy offering on the subject, dominated the
airwaves for much of the 2010 election campaign before the
proposal was withdrawn.4
In this context the Care and Support Bill making its way
through parliament at the time of writing represents a substantial
achievement. The reforms contained in the bill mark the most
significant changes to social care in a generation, through
capping lifetime costs for care (though not accommodation) for
the first time in England and paving the way for an interest-
bearing deferred payment scheme to be made available by local
authorities across the country, to prevent the need for people to
sell their homes against their wishes to meet care costs.
This report seeks to build on those reforms. It examines
how likely the Government is to succeed in fostering a new
market in long-term care products; it explores additional 
policy measures to facilitate more forward planning; and it
considers the new kinds of products that industry could 
create, to allow people to tap into housing wealth in more
sophisticated ways than the Government’s deferred payment
scheme allows for.
The report draws on seven months of research and
engagement with key stakeholders involved in the shaping of the
Care Bill reforms. This work has included six policy seminars,
including one at each of the three 2013 party conferences with
relevant ministers and shadow ministers, as well as in-depth
interviews with experts in the field, and desk-based modelling
and research at Demos and Cass Business School, part of City
University, London.
Our fundamental argument is that the Care and Support
Bill will not be enough, on its own, to produce a step change in
the way people plan for social care and that the care cap
established through the current reforms is a necessary but
insufficient step. Policy must go beyond these measures to draw
on behavioural economics to spur people into action,
particularly to overcome the known lack of public awareness of
the realities of care funding costs. Government should sharpen
incentives to ensure that people have good reason to plan ahead
and new long-term care products will be needed, including
products that draw on housing equity but also enable people to
plan ahead for care.
Chapter 1 focuses on demand-side barriers to encouraging
much greater forward planning for social care costs. It argues
that people lack good information about care costs and their
likelihood of facing them, noting further ‘behavioural’ barriers,
such as a tendency towards inertia and a natural bias towards
optimism, which may stop people from acting even when well
informed. We recommend that the Government addresses these
barriers by requiring individuals to go through an online
financial health check as a condition of receiving their first
payment from the state pension. Such a move could ‘nudge’
people to take steps to prepare for care costs in later life.
Chapter 2 examines the means test proposed by the
Government, which builds on the recommendations made in the
Dilnot report on social care funding.5 We argue that the design
of the means test makes it overly complex to understand, making
planning ahead more difficult than it should be. This complexity
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risks exacerbating people’s natural tendency towards
disengagement and inertia and in this chapter we set out an
alternative, simpler means test to address this.
Chapter 3 explores the incentives that arise from the means
test. We suggest that there is a risk of ‘moral hazard’ when
government is willing to cover the costs of those who cannot
afford to pay for their own care. We argue that the Government
should examine ways to encourage and reward those willing to
take steps to cover their own care, and explore two ways in which
it could reward those willing to make commitments in advance to
funding social care.
Chapter 4 identifies how people are likely to find the
resources to fund care up to the level of the care cap. We note
that pension savings will be inadequate for the vast majority,
leaving housing wealth as a key part of the equation for many.
We recognise that this will mean different things for different
people, with some choosing to downsize and others turning to
equity release options. We argue that the Government’s deferred
payment scheme will be suitable for some, but will not facilitate
forward planning in the way that private sector products could.
Chapter 5 sets out some broad parameters for new financial
products in this area, which would do the things that deferred
payment schemes cannot – facilitate forward planning and help
fund domiciliary care – while offering value for money, as part of
a deal that consumers will be able to understand more easily. We
demonstrate a product that could fulfil these criteria, based on a
model that would see providers agreeing to cover future care
costs up to the level of the cap in exchange for an agreed
percentage of a consumer’s housing equity. Anyone could buy it
but it would be particularly suitable for homeowners who are
unable to self-fund and without enough disposable income to
purchase a conventional insurance product. We offers some
stylised modelling on how such a product could work in
practice.
19
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‘These reforms bring reassurance to millions of people by ending
the existing unfair system so no one need face unlimited care
costs or the prospect of selling their home in their lifetime,’
argued care minister Norman Lamb, as the Government
announced its plans for the reform of social care funding in
2013.6 The measures the minister was referring to have since been
developed, consulted on and inserted into the Care and Support
Bill. This chapter argues that:
· the reforms represent a welcome move towards a ‘social
insurance model’, through which the state helps individuals to
pool risks of high care costs
· while a key goal of the reforms is to create a vibrant market for
long-term care products, there remain supply-side and demand-
side barriers
· in particular, government must anticipate the ‘behavioural’
obstacles to forward planning, in the same way it applies
‘behavioural insights’ to other areas of policy
· the Government should ‘nudge’ people to prepare for future care
costs through an online financial health check at retirement age
· participation in this health check should be a condition of
people making their first withdrawal from the state pension
· the Government should explore the potential for a face-to-face
financial health check, which would be more personalised and
extensive than the health check people would have when they
reach retirement age, and would occur earlier in people’s lives
The Dilnot reforms
The Care and Support Bill is based on the framework provide by
the Dilnot Commission on social care funding. It contains
provisions to cap the lifetime costs of social care at £72,000,
while also limiting annual accommodation or ‘hotel costs’ (which
are not included in the cap). The bill increases the means test for
residential care as well as the capital threshold for the residential
care means test, which will rise to £118,000.7
The proposed reforms have not been immune from criticism.
The Centre for Social Justice has described the provisions
contained in the bill as ‘the wrong priority at the wrong time’,
objecting to what it regards as middle class welfare and arguing
that ‘helping the most disadvantaged must be the starting point
for any reforms’.8 However, the ‘care cap’ is best understood as a
move towards social insurance, designed to protect people against
risks beyond their control, and it is this feature that has helped
gather a relatively broad coalition of support for the changes.
Under the old means test anyone with assets over £23,250
received no financial state support and was therefore required to
fund their own care. This left some individuals and families open
to catastrophic costs and many having to sell their homes to pay
for care. The Dilnot report found that under the current,
unreformed system half of over-65s could expect to pay care bills
of up to £20,000, with one in ten facing costs of £100,000 or
more.9 Some could spend hundreds of thousands of pounds on
care in later life. Dilnot himself described this as ‘a bit like being
in a shop with no prices’, arguing that ‘we are moving to a world
where people are effectively insured by the state which should
make them feel much more comfortable’.10
In practice, the cap will provide financial support to only a
few people. It is estimated that around 30 per cent will need
long-term care at some point in their lives11 and of these 16 per
cent are projected to reach the cap.12 Our own research suggests
that it will take several years for many to reach the cap –
something we return to in chapter 3. However, this element of
risk-sharing is implicit in any insurance policy. Risks are pooled,
so those who turn out to face higher costs are subsidised by
others – but everyone’s liabilities are limited. It is what Winston
Churchill once described as ‘bringing the magic of averages to
the rescue of millions’. Furthermore, as Dilnot himself noted,
even those who do not benefit financially should enjoy greater
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peace of mind as a result of having an upper limit put on lifetime
care costs.
Creating a market
Beyond risk pooling, the social care cap has another explicit
purpose. With government having capped the liabilities that
people will face, it is expected that people will be in a better
position to take steps to prepare for the costs of care up to the
level of the cap. The idea is that the cap will open up space for
industry to step into, with new financial products designed to
help people to plan ahead. The government statement on
funding reform, issued in February 2013, put it this way:
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the limit on people’s care costs will provide greater incentives to provide
relevant products that people see the benefit of purchasing.
The government expects the financial services industry to work creatively to
amend existing products and develop new products that support people in
making choices about how to plan for their care costs.13
The Prime Minister has been more bullish still about the
development of a market for risk pooling, asserting that ‘it’s
right to try and put in place a cap which will then open up an
enormous insurance market, so people can insure against that
sort of catastrophic loss’.14
The development of such a market would be a considerable
achievement, given recent history and some scepticism over the
capacity for such a market to grow in the near future.15 As the
Government’s impact assessment on the new funding
arrangements acknowledges, care liabilities have proven difficult
to insure against, with providers citing difficulties establishing
sustainable products and withdrawing from the market in the
2000s.16 Even with the establishment of a cap, some doubt the
likelihood of a new market developing either quickly or easily.
During interviews that formed part of this project,
representatives from the insurance industry echoed concerns that
the £72,000 liability could prove difficult to insure against. In
order to price risk effectively, insurance companies need to find a
way to predict care costs over an individual’s lifetime – and this
risk is difficult to quantify. While companies have data to draw
on for some of the variables determining care needs, such as life
expectancy and the probability of people facing disability at
some point in their lives, care costs are much more unpredictable.
This is because some people will draw on informal forms of care
support, such as that of family members, while others will rely
more on formal care. It will therefore be complicated to predict
when the care ‘meter’ will start, in the run up to reaching the
possible £72,000 cap. One insurance industry representative 
told us: ‘Care needs don’t necessarily lead to care costs – and 
if you’re pricing a product that is what you have to be able 
to predict.’
These supply-side issues pose problems but are likely to be
surmountable, as a clearer picture emerges over time about
average care costs under the new system and how the meter will
work. However, there are further demand-side barriers to be
overcome before a new market for long-term care products will
emerge. The first is that at present people have very little sense of
where and how the costs of social care will be divided between
themselves and the Government.
Information and awareness
One policy expert from Age UK pointed out: ‘Most older people
and their families know very little about social care before they
first encounter the system, typically at a time of crisis such as a
fall leading to an unplanned hospital admission.’17 This lack of
awareness is reflected in government figures showing that
around four people in ten are unaware that they might need to
pay for their care and support later in life.18 In large part this is
because many people simply have not stopped to consider it or
have assumed that the state is responsible for paying for this sort
of care. More than six in ten (63 per cent of) people say they
have hardly thought about how to pay for social care needs in
the future, while over seven in ten (72 per cent) say they have not
started to prepare.19
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When people do consider potential care costs, other studies
have found that people tend to underestimate the probability of
needing care themselves in the future. More than half believed
the probability was lower than 40 per cent, when in fact 65-year-
old men have a 68 per cent chance of needing care before they
die, and women an 85 per cent chance.20 (Note the chances of
needing institutional care are much less – perhaps 30 per cent.
Institutional care is usually described as long-term care. Social
care generally subsumes all forms of care – domiciliary, informal,
nursing home and so on.)
There is little awareness among the public of the precise or
even rough cost of paying for care. Surveys find that nearly half
of the public say they do now know the average weekly cost of a
place in a residential care home. The mean figure suggested by
those who think they know the cost is around £140 – far below
the actual average weekly fee of £531.21
Given that so few people have an accurate picture of the
key funding aspects of the existing system, it is unsurprising that
awareness of the details of the proposed reforms is low. A high
proportion (82 per cent) of those who are 50 and over are aware
of the cap on care costs, but less than one in ten (9 per cent) say
they know what limit it has been set at – a crucial factor. More-
over, researchers found there was little understanding of how the
care cap would be calculated among the general public.22
Without clear information about how the social care system
works, the real chances of needing some form of social care in
later life, and their liability to pay for it, people are unlikely to
take steps to prepare for the future in the way that policy makers
hope they might. All this has obvious implications for the
likelihood that people will take steps, ahead of time, to plan for
the costs of social care, through either saving or the purchase of
long-term care products. As the Association of British Insurers
has put it: ‘Where people do not understand the risks and costs
of care, the perceived value of planning ahead and paying
premiums is low.’23
To date, this lack of understanding has not been addressed
in a systematic way by either local or national government. ‘We
have a new system on the way, but it is not going to change
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behaviour if people don’t know about it,’ argued one financial
services representative in our discussions. The passing of the
Care and Support Bill therefore represents an opportunity for
government to communicate what people will be entitled to and
expected to pay. Given the expectation that financial service
companies will bring new long-term care propositions to market
it is also likely that industry will play some part in raising
awareness, as part of a bid to demonstrate the value of its
products.
However, the lesson from other policy areas is that
information provision is not always enough to spur action or
even engagement by consumers, even when it might appear to be
in people’s own interests. The UK Government and others
throughout the world are seeking to understand better the
behavioural quirks and biases that can confound the most
rational of policy incentives. The Government’s Behavioural
Insights Unit, dubbed the ‘Nudge Unit’ after the best-selling
book Nudge,24 is an expression of this. The Unit ‘applies insights
from academic research in behavioural economics and
psychology to public policy and services’25 and we set out some
options for how these insights could be usefully applied to
encourage forward planning below.
Behavioural barriers
Deep behavioural insights and bold policy measures are almost
certainly likely to be needed in order to address the awareness
challenge and encourage people to engage with long-term care
planning. One such challenge is ‘optimism bias’. Evidence in this
area suggests that people systematically underestimate the
chances of unwelcome things happening to them, such as getting
divorced, losing a job or being diagnosed with cancer, but
overestimate the likelihood of positive life events, such as having
gifted children, successful careers or long lives. Thus, even when
confronted with the odds, many expect to beat them.26
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Box 1 Optimism bias
Optimism bias refers to specific beliefs about whether positive or
negative events or outcomes are more likely to occur for oneself
than for others. For example, studies have found that, on
average, smokers regard their own risk of suffering from a
smoking related disease to be lower than that of other smokers.
Similarly, newlyweds underestimate the likelihood of going
through a divorce themselves, despite awareness of the divorce
rate. One study found that when asked the likelihood that they
would divorce in the future, the median response of newlyweds
was 0 per cent. The same study found that in a survey while
male respondents estimated that 20 per cent of children live
with their fathers following divorce, double that amount (40
per cent) estimated that this would be the case should they go
through a divorce themselves.27
Optimism bias can be a problem for organisations. The
UK government issues guidance on overcoming the problem,
finding that the costs of publicly funded projects tends to be
underestimated by between 10 per cent and 23 per cent.28
Inertia is another behavioural trait that suggests that good
information is unlikely to be enough on its own to stimulate
engagement – a lesson well learned from other policy areas.
Stakeholders in a range of positions, from ageing charities to
consumer groups and financial services, all repeatedly drew the
parallel with pensions in our discussions. Following years of
information campaigns to encourage more saving the
Government has decided the best strategy is to capitalise on
inertia, rather than seek to overcome it. Since 2013 employees at
the largest UK companies have been automatically enrolled into
occupational pensions by law, with the ability to opt out rather
than being expected to opt in themselves. Rather than try to
overcome inertia, policy makers have decided to work with the
grain of it instead. ‘Persuading people that they need to save is
one thing, getting them to actually do it is something else
altogether. That’s the lesson from pensions’, is how one financial
services provider put it. ‘People need the right encouragement,
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not just the right information,’ argued a stakeholder from one
ageing charity.
Box 2 Inertia
Inertia is ‘lack of movement or activity especially when
movement or activity is wanted or needed’29 and occurs when
there is a gap between people’s intentions and their actions. For
example, around 65 per cent of British people say they are
prepared to donate an organ after their death, yet only 27 per
cent of the adult population are registered donors.30 Policy is
increasingly based on not just changing attitudes, but linking
positive attitudes with action. The Office of Fair Trading has
produced its own work on inertia, recognising that it can
undermine traditional competition policy if not properly
accounted for.31 For example, there is evidence that people
tend to switch banks on average once every 26 years.
Awareness of these biases as significant obstacles for the
reforms suggests that while the provision of information is
necessary and important, it will be insufficient without people
being prompted in a more overt and deliberate way to consider
how they prepare for the potential costs of social care. While
there is no equivalent social care policy to equal the auto-
enrolment approach taken to encourage pension savings, there is
a strong case for interventions that provoke people to pause and
consider their options for care in later life.
The Government should learn lessons from its health
policy, which has introduced regular health checks in England
for those between 40 and 74, following an announcement in
2009.32 Under the new model, people will be invited in for a
health check over a five-year rolling cycle. The purpose is not
just to screen patients for problems, but also to equip them with
better information about how their lifestyle choices are affecting
their health. Meanwhile, the Welsh NHS is in the process of
establishing online self-assessment checks for those 50 and over,
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which will provide people with tailored health advice after they
fill in a questionnaire.33
Financial health checks
Online or face-to-face interventions are appropriate for financial
as well as physical health. We recommend that the Government
institutes a financial health check for everyone reaching the state
pension age. Each individual’s first withdrawal from the state
pension should be conditional on going through the health
check, to ensure universal participation in it. The health check
would be advisory and no more – people would still be left to
make their own choices – but it would be a useful ‘nudge’ to
encourage people to consider their assets, liabilities, planned
future income and possible future care needs.
There are different ways in which his financial health check
could be instituted. We recommend that the Government should
begin at the light-touch end of the spectrum. People should
simply be required to go through an online health check, such as
that already provided by the Money Advice Service,34 which
contains around 30 questions and takes around five minutes to
complete. The Money Advice Service ‘money health check’
provides tailored feedback based on the questions, and offers
prompts for immediate action and tools such as reminder emails
to encourage people to follow up on plans in the future.
Recommendation 1
The Government should make each individual’s first withdrawal
from the state pension conditional on going through an online
financial health check. The health check would be advisory only,
but would provide people with clear information and broad-
brush advice about social care costs.
This online tool should be coupled with easily digestible
facts, covering the likelihood of requiring social care, the
probable costs, the division of responsibility between
government and the individual and some broad-brush options
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for individuals to consider. This would be a powerful prompt for
people to consider in relation to their future, involving only a
very minimal imposition on each individual and a very low cost
to the taxpayer.
In the medium term, the Government should explore the
potential for something more personalised and extensive,
involving a face-to-face consultation and expert advice at the
point at which people are preparing for retirement. This would
be more likely to drive behaviour change, but would have far
greater cost implications. The Government should begin by
instituting the light-touch model and then consult on whether
there is public and industry support for a more extensive advice
system – and if so how the costs might be shared between
government, industry and individuals themselves.
Chapter summary
The care cap is an important step forward in the creation of a
more equitable system of social care funding, and a welcome
move towards a model of social insurance in which the state
protects people against catastrophic costs through pooling risk.
There is also the potential for it to help create a market for long-
term insurance products or related products, assuming measures
can be taken to address known supply-side barriers including the
inability to predict movements in care costs accurately. However,
there are demand-side problems too. The first of these is a lack of
public awareness about who is expected to pay for care and how
much it really costs. The second problem is that even when
people have good information, behavioural barriers such as
‘optimism bias’ and inertia greatly undermine forward planning.
Increasingly, government policy draws on behavioural
economics to ensure policy measures go with the grain of known
public behaviour. Harnessing approaches to pay for the costs of
care in later life will be crucial to encouraging a culture of
forward planning in relation to social care costs.
Alongside better public information policy makers should
‘nudge’ people to consider their options at an earlier stage. We
recommend making the withdrawal of people’s first state pension
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payment conditional on going through a financial assessment.
This would be one way of encouraging people actively to
consider the costs of care. However, even with these changes
making decisions will be hard. Part of this is caused by the
complexity of the means test for social care, which we turn to in
the next chapter.
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Ensuring that people understand – and stop to consider – the
likely costs of social care in old age would be a major step
forward in encouraging a culture of forward planning. However,
having understood their liability for care costs, people must then
be able to assess their options in a straightforward way. This
chapter argues that:
· a significant barrier to forward planning is the complexity of the
means test proposed as part of the Care Bill
· the multiple thresholds and ‘cliff edges’ contained in the means
test make calculating entitlements for state support much more
difficult than it should be
· the formula for ‘equivalising’ assets and income makes this
problem even worse
· a simplified model is required, which eliminates the cliff edges
and is based on a straightforward test of how many years of care
an individual can afford
· the Government should adopt the means test we propose, which
works on this basis
Complexity in the means test
In principle means tests are not difficult to understand: those
who have less receive more support. In practice, the
Government’s proposed model is far less straightforward. Not
only must people make ongoing calculations based on a formula
combining assets and income,35 there are various additional
complications to contend with, which make planning ahead
more complicated than it should be. At one of our seminars,
attended by a group of experts in the area, few people were
willing to say with any confidence that they understood the
means test in its entirety. One Age UK representative commented
that ‘working out the overall impact on a person’s income and
assets of the Dilnot reforms is complex and challenging’.36
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed means test boundary at the
heart of the Care and Support Bill. Those people with
insufficient assets or income falling inside the solid line (region
a) qualify for means tested support and those outside it do not
(region B). In this example, we base our calculation on an
assumed care home tariff of £25,000 per year. The graph
demonstrates that there are three thresholds and two ‘cliff edges’
in this system, where state support either begins or falls away
sharply. This makes the system difficult for people to understand
and respond to. For example, the upper limit of £118,000 gives
an impression that people should receive some state support if
their wealth is less than this. However, after taking their typical
retirement income into account a person will need assets of less
than £89,000 before they receive any state support.
Similarly, the ‘cliff edges’ make the system less intuitive
than it should be: support from the state can increase or decrease
very suddenly in certain circumstances but not in others. This
makes it difficult for people to adopt rules of thumb about the
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Figure 1 The means test proposed by the Government in the Care
and Support Bill
kind of support they can expect from the state as their
circumstances change. Instead, planning ahead requires people
to make a series of calculations if they are to benefit, rather than
lose out, from sharp changes in state support.
These kinds of complications make planning ahead an
extremely complex endeavour, with the risk that people are
overwhelmed and simply disengage altogether. As the last
chapter showed, inertia is likely to be a barrier in any case – but
disengagement becomes more and more likely the more complex
the system becomes.
In seminar discussions, financial services sector
representatives stressed that the complexity of proposals is likely
to undermine efforts to develop a market for long-term care
products. One representative commented:
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The more complex the system, the harder it is to understand whether a given
product will produce value for money. Not only do you have to understand
the product itself, but you also have to get to grips with all the different ways
the means test will affect the product in different situations. As the consumer
you have to start working through all sorts of scenarios – what if this product
tips me over this threshold or that cliff-edge and so on. It’s a nightmare.
Most consumers just aren’t going to do that... they are just going to switch off
all together.
The consensus among those in the industry is that a
consistent taper, without the cliff edges and thresholds in the
Government’s proposed system, would go a long way to
addressing this problem.
A simplified means test
In our discussions with consumer groups, ageing charities and
financial services providers, representatives from these bodies
were unanimous that a simpler means test, with a consistent
taper, is required to encourage forward planning.
Figure 2 sets out how such a test could work. It eradicates
the boundaries and cliff edges in the Government’s proposed
means test, simplifying the test significantly by providing a
consistent taper. The formula for our simplified means test 
is set out in appendix 1 but, at its most basic, it works through
establishing how many years in residential care an individual
could afford through a combination of their assets and income.
Those who can afford more years of care receive less support
from government. Each year, people are reassessed, so that as
people’s assets deplete over time – meaning they can afford 
fewer years of care in the future – they receive more help from
the state.
Figure 2 illustrates how our proposed, simplified means
test would work by showing the distribution of people affected
in proportion to those individuals’ income and assets. As with
figure 1, this assumes an annual care home tariff of £25,000 per
year. People falling inside the solid line (region A) qualify for
means tested support and those outside do not (region B). The
graph also demonstrates how different groups would be affected
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Figure 2 Simplified means test with contours showing
concentrations of wealth in the 65+ population
by our proposed means test, with contours showing
concentrations of people aged over 65 in different parts of the
income–asset spectrum.
The concentration at the foot of the chart between the
£8,000 and £15,000 income brackets represents people with
assets of less than £25,000 and income of about £10,000. This
group mostly comprises non-home owners. A second
concentration includes people with assets of over £100,000 and
an income of around £10,000. This group consists mostly of
home owners. In total, there are about 3.4 million individuals
age over 65 in region A, who would be eligible for some state
support from the outset, and 8.3 million in region B – some of
whom may need support at a later stage in their care cycle.37
The simplified means test in practice
Figure 3 illustrates how our simplified means test would work in
practice. This shows the percentage of costs that would be met
by the state based on the number of years of care afforded.38
Those who are able to afford care for a higher number of years –
through a combination of their assets and income – receive less
support, while those who can afford care for fewer years receive
more support.
For example, people who could afford up to one year of
care are in band A. This group receives between 80 per cent and
100 per cent of their care costs. Those who could afford to pay
for care for between one and two years are in band B. This group
receives 60 per cent to 80 per cent of their care costs. Those who
can afford to pay for care for between two and three years are in
band C and receive between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of care
costs – and so on. Anyone who can afford five years of support
or more receives no support with their care costs until their
income and assets are depleted such that they fall into one of the
bands on the graph.
Recommendation 2
The Government should implement a simplified means test, to
facilitate easier forward planning. This means test would be
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based on establishing how many years of care individuals could
afford, through a combination of their assets and income.
Under the Government’s proposed means test, entitlements
are set to be recalibrated each year as people’s financial circum-
stances change. We do not propose changing this. Therefore,
under our proposed means test it is likely that from one year to
the next, people may move from one band of support into another,
gaining more support over time as their wealth diminishes.
Box 3 Example: Recalibrating support under our 
simplified system
Through a combination of her income and assets, an
individual can afford between two and three years of
care. This means that she is placed in band C and
receives between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of care
costs that year.
The following year her entitlements are
recalibrated, to take account of the fact that she has been
paying for care costs over the course of that year.
Because her combined income and assets are now lower
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Figure 3 Simplified means test showing the levels of support for
different years of care afforded
than a year ago, she can now afford between one and
two years of care, rather than between two and three, 
so she is placed in band B and has 60 per cent to 80 
per cent of her care costs covered by the state during
that year.
After a year her entitlements are recalibrated again
to reflect her financial position.
Overall, we anticipate that under our reformed system the
costs to the taxpayer would be roughly equivalent to those
arising from the Government’s proposed means test. Any
variation could also be adjusted by using different tapers.
However, within this spending envelope, our simplified formula
would provide less state support in the early years of care and
more support in later years as a consequence of eliminating the
cliff edges in the Government’s proposed system. This would fit
with the overall principles of the Dilnot review and the Care and
Support Bill, which are to continue to support those who have
little, but to provide greater protection for those who end up
facing higher costs.
How our simplified means test would work over time
Table 1 provides an example of how our simplified means test
would work over time. It is designed to show the financial costs
to an individual and the state of a typical person who enters a
care home and is initially self-funding. We assume a tariff made
up of £12,000 care costs and £13,000 living costs. The individual
begins with £100,000 of savings and £10,000 income, so can
afford 6.7 years of care and is not entitled to any support.
As the individual’s assets are depleted over time as a 
result of paying for care costs each year, state support begins 
to kick in. By the time the cap is reached in year 6 the cost to 
the state will be £27,901 and to the individual £121,099. The 
out of pocket contribution during year 6 is £13,951 of which
£10,000 is met from income, leaving £3,951 to be met from
savings. The assets remaining at the end of year 6 is then 
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£41,852 – assets at the start of the year less £3,951 leaving £37,901
in this example.
The table illustrates three important points:
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Table 1 Care cost progression over a six-year cycle up to the cap
including the depletion of assets, state support and out-of-
pocket costs
Year in Cumulative Assessable State Cost to Contribution
care care capital at support (£) individual to cap (£)
payments start of care (£)
(£) year (£)
1 25,000 100,000 - 25,000 12,000
2 50,000 85,000 - 25,000 24,000
3 75,000 70,000 1,667 23,333 36,000
4 100,000 56,667 6,111 18,889 48,000
5 125,000 47,778 9,074 15,926 60,000
6 150,000 41,852 11,049 13,951 72,000
Total 27,901 122,099
· Because accommodation costs are not included in the
Government’s £72,000 care cap, costs to the individual can
mount up considerably even with a cap in place. The individual
in this example pays more than £122,000 in total – including
accommodation costs – before the cap kicks in, leaving them
liable for ongoing accommodation costs.
· It is likely to take several years for many people to reach the cap
in practice – six years in the case of this individual.
· The pace of depletion of assets – though high in the early years –
gradually tails off.
A final and crucial point to note in light of these features of
the means test is that the average life expectancy in residential care
is around two and a quarter years.39 This explains why only a small
proportion of people could be expected to reach the cap, either
under the Government’s proposed means test or our simplified
version.
Fair treatment of assets and income
A further positive feature of our simplified means test is that it
would neither favour income nor savings. This contrasts with the
Government’s proposed means test, which favours assets over
income. Table 2 demonstrates this through three hypothetical
examples – persons A, B and C – and assumes care costs of
£25,000 a year.
Person A has £50,000 of savings and £10,000 income per
annum. He can notionally afford 3.33 years of care, based on
total care costs including care itself and ‘hotel costs’ of £25,000.
Person B has £33,333 of savings and £15,000 income per annum.
He can also notionally afford 3.33 years of care out of pocket.
Person C has £66,667 of savings and £5,000 income per annum.
She can also notionally afford 3.33 years of care out of pocket.
Table 2 shows that the Government’s proposed system
unfairly favours people with large savings above people with
higher incomes because it delivers more state support to person
C than to person A, even though the two can afford the same
number of years of care. Our simplified means test would
eradicate this problem, delivering the same level of support to
persons A, B and C because money gained from assets and
income is treated equally. There is no formula to ‘translate’ a
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Table 2 The amount of state support delivered by the simplified
and proposed means test for three people of equal
wealth
Person Category Amount Years of Simplified Proposed
(£) care support support 
afforded (£) (£)
A Income 10,000 3.33 8,333 6,603
Savings 50,000
B Income 15,000 3.33 8,333 8,136
Savings 33,333
C Income 5,000 3.33 8,333 9,669
Savings 66,667
given amount of income per annum into a given amount of
assets; instead our simplified system simply calculates how many
years people could notionally afford, by adding together assets
and income.
In our system state support gradually increases as the total
figure – based on a combined figure for assets and income –
declines as people run down their assets to pay for their own
care. Table 3 summarises the differences between the
Government’s proposed means test and our simplified system.
Chapter summary
The means test proposed by the Government in response to the
Dilnot recommendations risks discouraging forward planning
because of the in-built complexity that arises from the
combination of various thresholds, cliff edges and the formula to
convert assets into income for the purposes of assessing
eligibility. There is a risk that this level of complexity will lead to
fatalism and inertia, rather than forward planning.
We propose a simplified means test, which would go a long
way to making it easier for people to plan ahead. Our simplified
system, which we believe would be no more costly to the
taxpayer than the Government’s proposed system, would be
based on the number of years an individual could afford through
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Table 3 The Government’s proposed means test compared with
our simplified system
Proposed government means test Our simplified system
Cliff edges and thresholds Consistent taper 
Formula to convert income into Income and assets added together to 
assets establish years of care afforded
Favours assets over income Assets and income treated equally
Delivers more support in initial Delivers less support in initial stages, 
stages, less in later stages more in later stages
a combination of their assets and income. Each individual’s
financial position would then be reassessed each year, and this
approach would be adaptable for domiciliary and institutional
care purposes with certain important differences such as the
treatment of housing assets.
We recognise that simplifying the system would not resolve
all the problems with the Government’s proposed approach. A
further risk, as with any means test, is that of moral hazard: that
people able to self-fund would instead choose to rely on
government funding. We turn to this problem in the next
chapter.
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If more people are to plan ahead for the costs of social care then
they must first understand their liabilities so they are in a
position to assess their options. However, there is a risk that
equipped with this information people will simply choose to do
nothing at all – or, worse, to deliberately run down their assets.
This is because, through the means test, the state offers a safety
net as a funder of last resort. This chapter argues that:
· the means test creates the risk of ‘moral hazard’: people may
choose to let the state cover the costs of their care rather than
provide for themselves
· there should be stronger incentives for self-funding
· encouraging a new generation of self-funders would produce a
saving for the taxpayer
· the Government should perform a cost-benefit analysis of the
two policy options set out in the chapter, which are designed to
encourage more self-funding
Care funding shortages
One of the problems that the Dilnot review was set up to address
was the shortfall in funding for social care, illustrated in figure 4,
which shows demand for care growing at a faster rate than
funding. Between 2005/06 and 2009/10 demand for social care
outstripped funding by 9 per cent. This funding gap goes some
way to explaining the problems with standards in the care sector.
When the same resources are spread over a larger number of
people, it is always likely that standards will drop.
There is evidence that these fears are being borne out in
practice. In 2013 a record number of care homes were issued with
official warnings by the Care Quality Commission (CQC), which
identified failings judged to put the vulnerable at risk.41 More
than 900 notices were issued by the CQC over the course of a
year, an increase of 43 per cent from the year before.42 Such
figures, alongside some high profile cases of abuse and neglect,
have filtered through into the public consciousness. Demos
research has revealed overwhelmingly negative perceptions 
of residential care, with only a quarter of adults saying they
would consider moving into a care home if they became frail in
old age.43
Experts in the sector warn against attempting to ‘provide
care on the cheap’, and in 2013 the director general of Saga
Group observed, ‘We have a crisis in the care home sector, with
staff on minimum wage pay delivering minimal care, rather than
the decent and dignified care that people deserve.’44 These
sentiments were echoed by various stakeholders in the research
for this report. Local authority officers expressed concerns about
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Figure 4 Expenditure and demand in social care for the elderly in
the UK, 2005/06–2009/10
Source: Dilnot40
the growing proportion of local authority funding being taken
up by social care provision and the difficulty of achieving quality
standards when faced with such demand. One senior politician
summarised the problem by suggesting that people would not be
willing to see their own parents treated in many care homes.
Dilnot’s answer to the problem of underfunding was to
create a system with a higher proportion of self-funders and a
smaller proportion of people reliant on state funding:
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It is our expectation that our reforms will be an important step in delivering
higher quality services overall. Our proposals should lead to a better resourced
system, in which people are less fearful of the future, feel able to spend their
money more effectively and can manage their care as best suits them.45
The mechanism to create a better resourced system is the
care cap, which Dilnot believed would enable and encourage
people to plan ahead by clarifying their responsibilities. The
Dilnot report describes the proposal for a care cap as ‘a type of
social insurance policy, with a significant “excess” that people
will need to cover themselves’.46 In some ways this is a fair
description, in that the cap does pool risk, in an attempt to
protect people from contingencies outside their control.
However, unlike most insurance policies, the post-Dilnot
system contains no formal incentives for people to contribute
because those who have nothing or relatively little in the way of
assets or income will receive state support under the means test.
Under the proposed reforms state support will be available for
those entering residential care with assets of £118,000 or less,
while anyone with less than £17,000 in assets will have their care
paid for entirely.47
Moral hazard
Given the fall-back option of the means test, there is a risk that
people will choose not to make provision for their own care
costs, leaving the taxpayer to foot the bill. The Association of
British Insurers puts it bluntly:
There is no benefit to the individual of planning ahead unless they have
income or assets well above the means test threshold, because saving or
insuring for care costs means that the individual does not benefit from 
state support.48
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In practice, people could choose to run down their assets in
order to ensure qualification for the means test, or fewer people
might take active steps to ensure that they have the means to
cover care costs in old age. One local authority official argued,
‘It is our job to look after the most vulnerable, but we have to get
better at persuading the rest to put money aside. That’s the
difficulty with the means test.’
The Government recognises this problem in the current
system. As the official statement on funding reform, issued in
February 2013 put it, ‘There are large incentives in the current
system for people who would otherwise not receive financial
support to hide their assets to gain access to government
support.’49 The document sounds a note of optimism that 
the care cap will ‘make it more likely that people would 
pay their fair share’ but the reality is that the care cap 
does little to change the situation of those close to the 
means test threshold. In discussions for this project, a
representative from a charity for social care users warned 
that ‘a market has sprung up in terms of companies 
peddling trusts to avoid long-term care fees’.
The social care system already contains measures designed
to prevent people from intentionally running down their assets in
order to qualify for the means test. The rules stipulate that if
someone is judged to have done this deliberately to avoid care
costs councils are permitted to treat that person as if they still
owned the assets. However, financial advisers engaged in this
project described this as a ‘grey area’. Equally, Age UK guidance
published in April 2013 on the deprivation of assets and the
means test explains that the organisation ‘continues to work to
clarify the rules’50 – suggesting the rules are hardly watertight.
Other stakeholders involved in discussions for this project
warned that local authorities are not yet implementing the rules
as rigorously as might be expected.
Where the rules are clearer it is evident that low-level
spending, planned in advance, would not constitute a breach of
the rules. For example, the Department of Health guidance states
that in regard to capital
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it would be unreasonable to decide that a resident had disposed of an asset in
order to reduce his charge for accommodation when the disposal took place
at a time when he was fit and healthy and could not have foreseen the need
for a move to residential accommodation.51
In interviews for this project, government officials
expressed greater concern about inaction than the deliberate
deprivation of assets. As one put it:
The rules we have should be enough to stop people playing the system. The
bigger worry is that people won’t do anything at all... they will drift along
and end up relying more on the Government than they should do.
Clearly it is likely that large numbers of people will simply
be less inclined to make sacrifices over a long and indeterminate
period of time when they know that local authorities will fund
their care if necessary. Low-level awareness that the government
is the funder of last resort will add to the risk of inertia described
in previous chapters.
This attitude is demonstrated in the responses given to 
a survey in 2012 by Just Retirement (figure 5). Of those who 
said that they are interested in equity release products, just 
4 per cent said that the purpose of releasing equity would be 
to pay for care in old age. Under the current system, at least,
there is little expectation that people will draw on their assets 
to cover care costs.
Incentives for forward planning
All of this has important implications for taxpayers, who must
foot the bill for those unable to afford to cover their own social
care costs. It is also likely to diminish the standard of care
received by those relying on state support, with resources spread
more thinly than need be the case. The challenge, then, is to find
the best way to offset the risk of moral hazard with a stronger
incentive for people to make provision to pay for their own care.
To meet this risk of moral hazard, the Government should
explore ways to encourage and reward those willing to take steps
to guard against the costs of care in later life. The aim should be
to create a virtuous circle, in which more people are encouraged
to self-fund, reducing the number of people falling into the
means test, and thereby freeing up resources to reward thrifty
and responsible forward planners (figure 6).
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Figure 5 Reasons for expressing an interest in equity release
Source: Just Retirement52
In our interviews for this report industry figures, third
sector groups and government officials all recognised the
potential for such incentives. There was a consensus that incen-
tives should fulfil two essential criteria. First, any new incentive
should encourage an outcome – self-reliance – rather than a
method of paying for care. A representative of one consumer
group warned, ‘Government should avoid favouring particular
products individuals and their families are best placed to make
those decisions. People need the right information, not someone
telling them which route to go down.
Second, new policies should work to minimise ‘dead-
weight’ costs. One Whitehall official commented: ‘You don’t
want to be throwing money at people to reward them for things
they are likely to do anyway. If there’s going to be an incentives
for people to self-fund, you want it to actually change behaviour.’
An incentive for forward planning should reward those who are
thrifty and responsible – but also encourage more people to
demonstrate those virtues.
We propose that the Government explore two options for
doing this, both of which have the same basic idea at their heart:
people should be encouraged to ring-fence, or set aside in
advance, portions of their wealth to pay for the costs of social
care later in life. In doing so people would provide reassurance
to government they will be in a position to cover the costs of
some or all of their care in old age, rather than fall back on 
state support through the means test. To reward and encourage
more of this behaviour, government would offer an incentive 
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Figure 6 Virtuous circle in forward planning
for people to make commitments ahead of time. The aim 
would be to use the mechanism of ring-fencing alongside the
offer of an incentive, in order to produce a higher number of 
self-funders.
Option 1 The savings model
The first of the two options that government should explore is a
savings model. This would involve the Government creating a
new legal mechanism, ‘care accounts’, through which people
could put funds aside specifically to cover the costs of care in
later life. People would be given the option of committing
portions of their current wealth – in the form of savings, housing
equity or a combination of both – into care accounts. Savings
could be transferred to care accounts through a simple bank
transfer; housing equity would be stored in the accounts through
a legal charge on their home.
The funds stored in these care accounts would be reserved
specifically for covering care costs, in such a way that access to
the amount pledged would then be triggered following a care
assessment. In this way, government would know that people
were setting money aside for their part of the bargain up to the
level of the care cap, reducing the risk of people relying instead
on support through the means test. The incentive for people to
ring-fence funds in these care accounts would be that a
proportion of the funds in the account would be disregarded in
calculations for the Government means test for care costs.
For example, if the Government offered a 10 per cent
disregard, then an individual with £50,000 in their care account
would only have £45,000 counted by the Government in
calculations for the means test. If the Government offered a 
20 per cent disregard then the same person would have only
£40,000 counted in the means test. If the Government offered a
30 per cent disregard then only £35,000 would be counted – and
so on. This policy would be designed to reduce the moral hazard
created by the means test, in that it would reward people for
setting money or housing equity aside, rather than treating this
as a reason for the Government to offer less support.
Rewarding contribution
An important feature of care accounts would be a set a
deadlines in people’s lives. For example, there could be a dead-
line that people could no longer add funds to the care account
once they have reached age 70. The purpose of preventing
people from adding money or equity to the account after the
deadline would be to provide a spur to action, rather than
allowing people to drift along and inertia to take hold. The
deadline would also serve to reduce deadweight costs, by
preventing people from sheltering assets in care accounts
immediately prior to care needs. The aim is to encourage forward
commitments and therefore increase self-funding, not simply to
subsidise everyone. Should care costs never arise, the
Government would have no claim on the money stored in the
care accounts. The accumulated value of the person’s care
account would go into their estate.
The deadline would also have implications for people
withdrawing money from care accounts, for example in the case
of a financial emergency. Until the deadline, people would be
able to withdraw money or equity from care accounts at any
point, without any consequences. After the deadline the funds
contained in the account would be committed to meeting social
care costs. Anyone seeking to withdraw funds from the account
would be subject to a financial charge or penalty. The purpose of
this arrangement would be to encourage people to leave funds in
the accounts to cover care costs, having made a commitment to
do so, but still leave them with enough flexibility to cope with
crises. In setting the level of the penalty, the Government would
need to ensure that the flexibility built in for personal financial
emergencies would not undermine the need for the ring-fence to
be a meaningful commitment for the vast majority of people
taking up the option.
One reason to think that people would be unlikely to want
to withdraw money is the phenomenon of ‘mental accounting’ –
people’s tendency to apportion money for particular categories
of spending and demonstrate a real reluctance to ‘cross subsidise’
spending from one category to another. If people put money
aside for a particular purpose, such as care costs, evidence
suggests they would become more reluctant to spend that money
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on other things. This implies that simply getting people to place
money or housing equity into care accounts should be half the
battle. The financial incentives associated with the account
would matter, but so too would the effect on the way people
would come to think about their savings.
Box 4 Mental accounting
The term mental accounting describes the way in which people
mentally apportion money for different sorts of spending in
their lives. For example, people create budgets for different
categories of spending, such as food, travel and entertainment.
Academics at Princeton University have identified that when
people spend over their assigned budget in one area of
spending, they tend to claw back savings in that area rather
than make up the ground through lower expenditure in a
different category.53
Policy makers in the UK are now beginning to explore
what this insight means for policies dealing with welfare and
saving. For example, the Department for Work & Pensions
(DWP) has been exploring the potential for ‘jam jar’ accounts,
which enable people to place either wages or welfare payments
into different accounts for different purposes. Such accounts
could encourage people to account mentally for portions of
their income as being ‘rent money’, even if in practice they are
free to spend it as they choose to.54
Another reason to believe that people would be reluctant to
withdraw money from care accounts is our natural tendency
towards loss aversion – the widely identified tendency for people
to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. Some
studies suggest that losses are twice as powerful, psychologically,
as gains. Therefore, loss aversion would be likely to have a strong
effect in discouraging people from withdrawing money from the
accounts and incurring penalties in the process. Loss aversion
would make people reluctant to give up a discount they felt they
had already earned.
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Box 5 Loss aversion
Loss aversion occurs when people experience more pain
from losses than they experience pleasure from
equivalent gains. For example, studies have shown that
people typically ask for higher prices when selling a
good than they are willing to pay when buying it.55
Similarly, people demonstrate reluctance to enter into 50/50
bets, suggesting that the risk of the pain outweighs the equally
likely prospect of gain.
Policy makers are increasingly interested in how to apply
this idea. For example, in the US researchers found that school
results improved when teachers were paid bonuses in advance
– with schools asking for them back only when results were not
achieved. This type of incentive had a greater effect than
traditional performance bonuses, which were paid only after
goals had been achieved.56
An important feature of care accounts is the potential to
ring-fence savings, housing equity, or a combination of both, up
to the level of the cap. At any point, people would have the
option of switching housing equity for savings in the account, or
vice versa. This would be a major step forward in encouraging
people to start to think through how to use all of their assets and
income, as a package, to cover the costs of care in later life.
Should people move house they would be able to reassign
portions of housing equity in their new homes, making the care
accounts ‘portable’ from one home to the next. For example,
should an individual owning a house worth £200,000 decide to
ring-fence £25,000 of housing equity and subsequently downsize
to a house worth £150,000 they would have two options: to
exchange the ring-fenced housing equity worth £25,000 for ring-
fenced cash to the same value, or to continue to ring-fence
£25,000 worth of equity in their new home.
When social care costs arose, people would be able to
spend the funds stored in their care accounts directly on care
costs – or on kite-marked long-term care products tied
specifically to cover those costs. Those people who had ring-
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fenced portions of housing equity, rather than cash savings,
would be required to release equity to pay for care, or to find the
equivalent amount of money from somewhere else. The
Government would not specify how people should release equity
– some might turn to financial products such as equity release,
others would choose to downsize – but merely that people
should do so, in order to meet their commitments.
One analogy for care accounts is pensions. With a 
pension, people set aside money to provide an income in later
life and the Government provides tax incentives to persuade
them to do so. In setting money aside, people are not pre-
committing to any particular product, they are simply partition-
ing funds to cover costs later in life. There is also a cap on how
much can be set aside in total to be able to qualify for tax relief
and rules about how much money can be withdrawn and from
which age.
The analogy with pensions should not be taken too far but
clearly they share several common features with care accounts.
The key point is that government should attempt to encourage
and reward thrifty behaviour for care funding as it does for
pensions saving, using a mechanism flexible enough for people
to set aside either savings or portions of housing equity. Care
accounts would be designed to achieve this.
Option 2 The insurance model
The second model that we believe the Government should
explore is based on insurance rather than savings, although it
also rewards people who set money aside, in advance, for their
social care costs. Under this model, the state would lower the
social care cap for anyone able to demonstrate in advance
through the means test that they will not require financial
support for social care. A key difference with conventional
insurance products is that the model would allow for the
possibility of using housing equity as payment rather than a 
cash lump sum or regular payments, which may be too expensive
for most.
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In practice, to qualify for this ‘early-bird discount’ people
would have to register the purchase of a long-term care insurance
product, with HM Revenue & Customs. Registered products
would be kite-marked, to confirm their status. Taking out
insurance against social care costs up to the level of the cap
would be one way of doing this.
The Government would reward all those willing to make
commitments in advance by reducing the level of the care cap for
those individuals. This reduction would take the form of a
percentage discount against the care cap. For example, if the
Government offered a 10 per cent ‘early-bird discount’ and the
national care cap was £100,000, then individuals who had made
advanced commitments would benefit from a lower cap of
£90,000. A 20 per cent ‘early-bird discount’ would produce a
lower cap of £80,000, and so on. This discounted cap would
limit individuals’ liability further, making it cheaper to insure
against care costs.
A final element of this policy would be a deadline, again a
set age in people’s lives, after which the ‘early-bird discount’
would expire. As with the savings option discussed earlier in this
chapter, the deadline would be a spur to action for individuals,
helping overcome inertia, and a means for government to reduce
deadweight costs. By setting the deadline relatively early, the
Government would help avoid offering a reduced cap to people
who might have bought such products anyway later in life.
Comparison of the two models
This second option – the insurance model – has potential
advantages and disadvantages in comparison with the savings
model, described earlier in the chapter. In theory, the insurance
model offers a level of simplicity that might appeal to people. A
reduced cap offers an incentive that would be straightforward to
understand, while insurance against care costs would provide
people with peace of mind that lifetime care costs (though not
‘hotel’ costs) would be covered. However, this route also has
some comparative disadvantages:
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· It depends on the ability of the private sector to find ways to
insure against care costs, something that we return to in 
chapter 5.
· It would offer less flexibility than the savings model, both in the
nature and level of the commitment required to qualify.
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Table 4 Differences between the savings model and the insurance
model
Savings model Insurance model 
Method: store funding in care Method: insure against care costs up 
accounts to cover care costs up to to the level of the care cap
the level of the cap
Deadline: after set age, individuals Deadline: after set age, individuals can
can no longer deposit into care no longer benefit from early-bird
accounts; suffer penalties for discount
withdrawal
Not locked in: Consumer can Locked in: Consumer cannot change 
change mind before deadline with mind, must make binding commitment
no consequences, after the deadline 
with a charge
Incentive: agreed percentage of Incentive: care cap reduced by an 
funds in care account disregarded agreed percentage 
from the Government means test
‘Nudge’: taps into mental ‘Nudge’: N/A
accounting and loss aversion
Financial benefit: rewarded for Financial benefit: rewarded for pre-
pre-committing funding for care committing funding for care
Financial risk: charge for Financial risk: individuals may never 
withdrawing funds from care need insurance policy they buy
account after deadline 
Other benefits: none Other benefits: peace of mind with
costs up to the care cap covered
Means testing: still required to Means testing: greatly reduced or 
assess eligibility for top up state avoided as all care costs covered
support
The key differences between the two options are set out in
table 4.
Further analysis
A full cost-benefit analysis of both incentives would need to be
performed before implementation. Both of these policies are
premised on the idea that encouraging more people to pre-
commit to making financial arrangement for their potential care
needs will reduce the extent to which people rely on government
support through the means test. For either policy to work, the
fiscal benefits from fewer people drawing on the means test, or
the same number of people drawing to a lesser extent, would
need to be higher than the fiscal costs of providing the incentive
to ring-fence money for care costs in advance.
There are reasons to be optimistic about the potential of
both these models. The savings model would benefit from the
fact that it would not subsidise those wealthy enough to be self-
funders, unaffected by the means test. Only those likely to be
affected by the means test would have any incentive to store
money in the care accounts, in order to benefit from the
disregard. This suggests that the policy would be targeted
specifically at the group who would need to be encouraged to
put more money aside for the taxpayer to generate any saving.
We recommend that the Government models these two options
to explore their viability.
Meanwhile, the insurance model would benefit from the
fact that just 16 per cent of the entire population is expected to
reach the cap at its current level, so even the discounted cap
would apply to only a minority in practice, making likely costs to
the taxpayer relatively low. By contrast, all of those insuring
against care costs would be guaranteed not to draw at all on the
means test, suggesting that savings to the taxpayer could be
significant, even after deadweight costs.
Recommendation 3
The Government should undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the
two policy options discussed in this chapter – the insurance
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model and the savings model – both of which are designed to
encourage and reward those willing to make provisions, in
advance, to pay for their own care.
One objection to these policy options might be made on
distributional grounds – that any new incentive for people to
purchase long-term care products would not benefit the least
well-off in society, for whom such products would be likely to be
out of reach. However, this would be to misunderstand the
nature of the incentive and the consequences of the policy
proving successful in practice. The nature of the incentives
suggested above is not to switch money from one group to
another but from one activity to another. Both the insurance
model and the savings model would subsidise forward planning,
rather than compensate for the lack of it through means testing.
The aim of the policy would be to save the taxpayer money
overall, leaving more resources available for the least well-off.
Chapter summary
The value of means tests is that they provide an eligibility test to
protect those who have nothing. But the problem is that they
produce moral hazard: people may choose to run down their
assets – or choose not to buy financial products covering the
costs of care – because they know that the state will be there as
the funder of last resort.
The Government should take steps to counterbalance the
incentives created by the means test in the post-Dilnot system.
One way of doing this would be to create savings accounts,
allowing people to put money aside for care in the form of either
savings or housing equity. The value in the care account would
accrue over time with access to the fund being triggered
following a care assessment. In determining eligibility for state
support a proportion of the care account balance would be
disregarded in the Government means test. This would be the
reward for people for setting money aside.
A second option would be to reward those who insure
against future care costs with a reduced care cap. This would
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make forward planning more attractive and should reduce the
number of people falling into the means test and thus potentially
lead to significant savings in administrative costs. The idea
behind both of these two options is that encouraging people to
self-fund to a greater degree could reduce costs for the taxpayer.
This still leaves the question of how people will find the money
to do this – and what the response from industry itself might be.
We turn to these questions in the next chapter.
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4 Unlocking housing
wealth
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The post-Dilnot settlement has two elements at its core:
protection from catastrophic costs and a safety net for those who
have very little. Chapter 3 recommended that the Government
should explore a third component: encouragement and reward
for those who plan ahead to cover the costs of their care. Even
with this third strand, however, there remains the question as to
how and whether people will find the money either to cover costs
directly or to pay for long-term care products. This chapter
argues that:
· pension savings will be insufficient to provide the funding
necessary for a good standard of care for most people
· housing wealth will be an essential part of the solution to the
problem of funding care in later life, reflecting sustained and
significant growth in house prices
· some will choose to downsize in order to release equity as a
means of covering care costs
· many will wish to remain in their homes but will still need to
draw on the wealth stored in their homes
· this group is likely to consider equity release products when
considering how to cover care costs
Pension shortfalls and house price growth
It is clear that pension savings and other pre-funded options are
unlikely to provide the answer to social care funding on their
own. The value of the state pension has gradually been eroded
over a sustained period, such that replacement rates for earnings
are among the lowest in Europe.57 The Government’s ‘triple 
lock’ on future increases to the state pension and the intro-
duction of the new, flat rate state pension from 2015 will help
boost the value of the state pension for many, but the days of
generous state pensions and defined benefit provision are
unlikely to return.
Defined contribution workplace schemes have not provided
a large enough bank of private pension savings for people to fall
back on. The average total employer and employee contribution
into defined contribution schemes was just 8.9 per cent of salary
in 2010, compared with 20.8 per cent for defined benefit
schemes.58 An estimated 6.25 million people aged 50 and over
have no pension plan in place and are likely to end up relying
solely on the state pension.59 Many of the experts we spoke to as
part of this project thought that in the long-term pensions
savings and social care preparations need to be integrated with
one another – but in the short term there is little prospect of
pensions providing funding adequate care for those with
anything more than minimal needs.
Many households may be able to plug the gap by tapping
into housing equity. One reason for this is the British disposition
towards storing personal wealth in bricks and mortar. As one
interviewee with a background in mortgage lending put it,
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There is something in the British psyche – something injected into us 
at birth in Britain – that drives the desire to own your own home. People 
see it as their goal, their achievement and then their nest-egg. I don’t see 
that changing.
A second reason why housing wealth will be an essential
route for funding social care is the extraordinary growth in house
prices in recent years. Aggregate house prices began to grow at a
faster rate than inflation from the mid-1980s onwards. Figure 7
plots the Retail Prices Index, the standard measure of inflation,
against the houses prices – and shows a dramatic divergence
between the two between the late 1990s and 2008. Though these
changes in house prices are not uniform across the country, as a
rule those who purchased their homes before 2000 will have seen
their asset rise in value considerably. In 1986, the average home
in a British city cost £35,209. Today the same property would
cost around £170,000.60
House prices and care costs
The effect of this rapid growth in house prices is that home-
owners will be able to draw on housing equity to fund social care
to a greater degree than in the past. Table 5 shows changes in
average house prices since 1980 and estimates of the change in
institutional care costs based on inflation. It demonstrates that
the ratio of house prices to care costs has increased from 3.8-fold
to 10-fold during that period. Housing equity was always an
important source of savings, and its importance has become
more pronounced as house prices have rocketed.
Further analysis shows the difference that tapping into
housing wealth can make in determining people’s ability to 
meet care costs over time. Figures 8 and 9 provide a break-
down of how many years of care different sections of the
population aged 50 and over could afford, first through income
and second through housing wealth. As with examples in
previous chapter, this assumes total care costs of £25,000 per
annum, made up of £12,000 going towards care itself and
£13,000 towards ‘hotel costs’.
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Figure 7 Average UK house prices compared with cost of living
index (Retail Prices Index), 1970–2010
Figure 8 demonstrates that most people would struggle to
pay for even one year of care if reliant only on income. By
contrast, figure 9 shows that if all wealth is taken into account
the picture changes dramatically and most people are able to
afford six years of care. The key factor which makes the
difference is the value of housing equity.
Options for self-funders
These examples demonstrate the importance of people finding
ways to tap into housing wealth to cover care costs up the level
of the care cap. Figure 10 shows the different ways in which
people are likely to be able to pay for their care, based on their
assets and income. It suggests that
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Table 5 Average house prices compared with the estimated cost
of care
Year Average house Estimated average Multiple (A/B) 
price (A) (£) annual cost of 
care (B) (£)
1980 26,885 7,106 3.8
1985 38,657 10,056 3.8
1990 77,151 13,405 5.8
1995 74,201 15,849 4.7
2000 118,847 18,102 6.6
2005 203,736 20,406 10.0
2010 235,251 23,763 9.9
Source: ONS61
· those with relatively low income and assets – group A – are likely
to have to rely on the state or to turn to new types of products,
such as personal care savings bonds, discussed by Mayhew and
Smith62
· those with high assets but a low income – group B – are likely to
need to release equity to cover the costs of care; the exception to
this will be a minority of those within this group with large
savings or housing assets, who might choose to buy a product
such as an immediate needs annuity63
· those with a moderately high income – groups C and D – are
likely to turn to either pension products such as disability-linked
annuities or insurance products paid for through income or
using a pension lump sum
· those with the highest incomes – group E – are likely simply to
self-fund and have no need of financial products
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Figure 8 Years of care most people could afford if funding is
based on their personal income only
Figure 10 gives an indication of the relative size of each of
these groups. The contours in the chart suggest that there is a 
large collection of people within group A with very low income 
and assets – this group is most likely to rely on the Government’s
means test for state support and new product innovations such 
as personal care savings bonds. The contours also show that 
there is another collection of people on the boundary between
groups A and B. This collection is likely to be amenable to using
housing equity to cover care costs, given the right opportunities 
to do so.
Releasing equity
Recent evidence suggests that people have some awareness of the
likely role of housing equity if they are going to cover the costs
of their own care, rather than rely on state support.65 In a recent
survey (under the current, pre-Dilnot care system) a majority said
that they could only afford to pay for long-term care if they sold
their house.66 Just over one in six reported seeing either their
parents or a close relative spend most of the equity in their home
on paying for long-term care. This shows there is relatively high
awareness among the population that housing equity may
provide the answer to funding care.
There are different ways to release equity, including
downsizing to a smaller house in order to release some of the
money stored in the current residence. Previous Demos research
has demonstrated there is an appetite for this, with more than
half (58 per cent) of people aged over 60 saying that they were
interested in moving – and a majority of that group interested in
downsizing by at least one bedroom. Three-quarters (76 per
cent) of older people currently occupying three-, four- and five-
bedroom homes declare an interest in moving somewhere
smaller. Overall a third of the over-60s are open to the idea of
downsizing, equating to 4.6 million over-60s across the UK.67
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Figure 9 Years of care most people could afford if funding is
based on their personal income and assets
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Figure 10 Product map showing how people are likely to be able to
pay for their long term care, by assets and income
Source: Mayhew et al68
These figures illustrate that some older people feel trapped
in their homes, without the confidence, information or physical
ability to move from one house to another.68 However, even
when this group is taken into account, this still leaves two-thirds
of over-60s who say that they do not wish to downsize.69 This is
almost exactly this proportion of people (67 per cent) who say
that they resent the idea of having to sell their home to pay for
social care.70
If people do not wish to move, but have a large proportion
of their overall wealth tied up in housing equity, the most
appropriate solution to the problem of funding care in
retirement is likely to be some form of equity release. This is the
analysis at the heart of the Government’s deferred payment
scheme, which is designed to tap into housing equity to cover
care costs on a wider scale than any government scheme to date.
Since 2001, local authorities have had discretionary powers to
defer self-funders’ residential care fees against a charge on
property, but provision of this service has been patchy around
the country, with local authorities setting their own eligibility
criteria in each area.
The Care Bill contains provisions to make the deferred
payment scheme available across the country. All authorities will
have a duty to offer deferred payments, with consistent rules for
eligibility, which fees can be deferred and for how long. At the
time of writing (early 2014), the precise eligibility criteria for the
scheme are still under consideration, but it is clear that the policy
is not geared towards forward planning and early intervention
because the deferred payment scheme is designed to meet the
care costs of those on the point of entering residential care, to
prevent the need to sell people’s homes too hastily.
As the Government’s impact assessment on the policy
notes, having to sell a home in a rush can lead to people losing
out on up to 25 per cent of the property’s market value.71 By
allowing people to defer payment until after death, at which
point homes must be sold, the Government hopes to protect
people from stress and financial loss. Officials we spoke to in
interviews for this project were clear on this point: the purpose 
of the deferred payment policy is to protect people from the
worst consequences of entering residential care without having 
a clear plan for how they are to pay for it. It is a damage limita-
tion policy, rather than one designed to encourage people to
think ahead.
The Government’s deferred payment scheme will be useful
for those who enter residential care with assets to draw on, but
will not help people to use housing wealth to pay for care while
they are still in their own home. This is a potential problem for
individuals and the Government as this form of ‘early inter-
vention’ has been shown to minimise care costs in the long run.
Small doses of care and support for people in their own homes
can delay or prevent the need to enter costly residential care.
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This gap in the deferred payment scheme creates an
important opportunity for the private sector to step in and add
value. There is an opportunity to provide equity release
products, which allow people to draw on housing wealth to
cover the costs of care while they remain in their homes. Such
products could help people live at home for longer, as many wish
to, while minimising care costs too. Policy makers and figures in
the industry agree that this opportunity is worth pursuing. As
one official close the deferred payment scheme put it,
The aim of the [deferred payment] policy is not to crowd out the private
sector. There ought to be a lot of space for new products which cover the
domiciliary care costs. That would be good for individuals because it would
keep care costs low – and actually it ought to help the Government too if it
means fewer people end up reaching the cap.
Chapter summary
Given the shortfall in pension savings and the rapid rise in house
prices in recent years, housing wealth is an essential part of the
solution to the problem of funding of care in later life. When
people are able to use some of their housing wealth to pay for
care, they can cover the costs of care for considerably longer.
Some people want to downsize, but many wish to remain in their
own homes, and these people are likely to be able to meet their
domiciliary care needs by using equity release products.
The Care Bill will make the local authority deferred
payment schemes available across the country, albeit with some
caveats on eligibility. This should protect those entering
residential care from having to sell their homes too quickly and
suffering losses as a result. However, the deferred payment
scheme is not designed to enable early intervention or encourage
forward planning. This is where the opportunity lies for private
sector products. The next chapter considers the parameters
equity release products that might serve this purpose.

5 New products: drawing
on housing wealth
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By establishing a care cap, the Government has challenged
industry to come forward with innovative financial products to
help people cover the costs of care in later life. As the last
chapter showed, many individuals are likely to find releasing
equity is an essential way of doing this – and using equity 
release products the best route for those wishing to remain in
their own homes.
This chapter argues that:
· traditional equity release products tend to be accessed by people
at the point when they require income, rather than as a device for
planning ahead
· this is especially the case with the Government’s deferred
payment scheme, which allows people to draw on housing equity
to cover costs only when they enter residential care
· new private sector products should go beyond this, by enabling
people to plan ahead, using housing wealth to cover care costs
even while they still live in their homes
· such products would serve an important purpose for consumers
– and may be of benefit to the taxpayer too
· the industry should explore the scope for new products along
these lines, while government should work with industry to
understand the ways in which policy can minimise supply-side
barriers
Box 6 What is equity release?
Equity release allows individuals aged 55 and over to release
money from the property they live in without having to make
any monthly repayments. By using an equity release product, a
home owner can draw a lump sum or regular smaller sums
from the value of their home, while remaining in their home.
There are two types of equity release – lifetime mortgages
and home reversion plans. Lifetime mortgages involve taking
out a type of mortgage, which typically does not require
monthly repayments. Rather than these payments, the loan
accrues compound interest over time. The customer retains
ownership of the house and the loan is repaid when they either
die or move into long-term care.
In home reversion plans providers purchase all or part of
a customer’s house, either through a lump sum payment or
through regular payments. The customers remain in the home,
rent-free, with a lifetime lease. Customers and providers retain
the same proportions of housing equity, regardless of changes in
house prices. At the end of the plan the property is sold and the
sale proceeds are shared according to the remaining
proportions of ownership.72
The SHIP standards
Equity release products are regulated by the Financial Conduct
Authority, and the Equity Release Council’s code of conduct,
known as the safe home income plan (SHIP) standards, sets out
a series of core principles that equity release products must meet.
Only those that meet the principles carry the SHIP standards
kite mark. The SHIP standards stipulate that:
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· customers have the right to remain in their property for life
provided the property remains their main residence
· customers will be provided with fair, simple and complete
presentations of their plans
· the client’s legal work will always be performed by the solicitor
of his or her choice, who will be required to sign a certificate to
the effect that the plan has been explained to the client fully and
that they understand the risks and benefits of the plan
· customers have the right to move their plan to another suitable
property without any financial penalty
· the Equity Release Council certificate will clearly state how the
loan amount will change, or whether part or all of the property is
being sold
· all Equity Release Council plans carry a ‘no negative equity
guarantee’, whereby no customer will ever owe more that the
value of their home73
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We believe there is an opportunity for new products to be
introduced that build on these standards, but go beyond both
the traditional model and the Government’s deferred payment
scheme by facilitating forward planning for social care. There is
an opportunity for products that allow consumers to cover the
costs not just of residential care, as the Government’s deferred
payment scheme does, but also of domiciliary care. Such
products would enable people not just to unlock value from their
homes, but also to go on living in them for longer, as many wish
to. As the last chapter demonstrated, such products would also
have the advantage of releasing money for early intervention,
helping stave off chronic care needs, rather than just providing a
way of paying for residential care when it is needed.
New opportunities
In interviews, industry figures familiar with the equity release
market were keen to stress the importance of simplicity in the
design of such products. This view mirrors the discussion earlier
in this report, about the risk that the complexity of products puts
people off making decisions altogether: ‘It’s got to be simple and
intuitive – if you need a maths degree to understand it then
people probably aren’t going to buy it,’ was how one interviewee
put it. New products ought to be straightforward from the
perspective of the consumer, so that people can readily under-
stand and make judgements about their appropriateness and
usefulness.
This demand for simplicity is often linked to the need for
products to provide value for money, beyond the SHIP require-
ment of protection against negative equity required by the code’s
no negative equity guarantee. Equity release advocates from within
and outside the industry were often most insistent about this.
It is important to stress that our idea of a savings account,
described in chapter 3, does not constitute a new product of
itself. Instead it is a mechanism for setting aside part of one’s
wealth to pay for future possible care costs. When care is
triggered the value of the fund is released and only then would
individuals choose from financial products available in the
market-place. These include equity release draw down products
or immediate needs annuities:
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· Equity release products allow individuals to withdraw cash to
pay for care at the point of need; the value of the loan plus
interest is payable when the home is sold.
· An immediate needs annuity pays for some or all of a person’s
care costs until death or on sale of the home and the payment of
a lump sum.
In the next section we explore a completely new type of
product.
Recommendation 4
Providers in the equity release industry should explore the
potential for new products that have the following
characteristics:
· conform to the SHIP standards
· enable forward planning
· release money for domiciliary care
· offer a simple deal for consumers
· provide value for money
Outline of a new product
There will no doubt be many product variants able to build on
the SHIP standards, enable forward planning, cover domiciliary
care, offer a simple deal and provide value for money, but below
we explore how a new ring-fenced product based on the
insurance option described in chapter 3, using housing equity as
payment, might work. This should be regarded not as a full
product design, but rather a concept for providers to build on
where they see fit.
The product complements the Government’s deferred pay-
ment scheme, but has certain key differences. As with the policy
proposals set out in chapter 3, the mechanism, again, would be
for people to ring-fence part of the equity in their homes,
without having to sell their house, in return for the provider
covering the individual’s care costs up to the level of the care
cap. Any products built along these lines would seek to dovetail
with the state system of support – something the Association of
British Insurers believes would be attractive to consumers.
This form of ring-fencing would be an equity-for-insurance
deal, which could work in conjunction with the ‘early-bird’
discount suggested in chapter 3. As with traditional equity
release products, the product would be ‘portable’, allowing
people to move house subject to an updated agreement being
drawn up with the provider, ring-fencing a percentage of equity
in the consumer’s new home.
One of the advantages of a product structured along these
lines is that it would overcome one traditional obstacle to pre-
funded insurance schemes – that consumers have proven
unwilling to make sacrifices to their current standard of living to
cover against the possibility of care costs in the future. Faced
with other demands, such as mortgage payments and pension
contributions, alongside day-to-day living costs, people have
tended to take their chances with care costs, rather than make
sacrifices to pay into insurance schemes. Paying for insurance
through equity would offer one way round this. People would
not face additional day-to-day costs, hedging their risk against
high care costs with housing equity rather than disposable
income, for which they may have made other plans. Over the
long term this would still come at a cost, but it would not require
people to make short-term sacrifices in their standard of living to
address long-term risks.
The individual and the provider would agree that the
provider would recoup a percentage of housing equity from the
individual, either at the moment when she or he enters
residential care or at the end of that person’s life.
Table 6 compares this proposed ring-fenced product with
the Government’s deferred payment scheme. As discussed in
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previous chapters, individuals have a relatively low chance of
reaching the cap so, simply through risk pooling, providers
ought to be able to price the risk at less than the level of the cap
itself. Therefore, through a risk pooling mechanism, providers
may be able to offer insurance against care costs for less than the
level of the cap itself.
Such a deal would need to have some safeguards built into
it, protecting both consumers and providers from dramatic
swings in house prices. Consumers would need to be protected
against the risk that house prices would rise so fast that products
would become more expensive than the risk they were insuring
against. This could, theoretically, be the case with a product
based on committing a percentage of equity, without safeguards
built into it. To address this, providers could offer a guarantee
that they would not recoup equity higher than the value of the
care cap – or better still a fixed proportion of the care cap. This
would ensure that any consumer entering into the deal was
genuinely hedging against the risk of care costs up the level of
the cap.
In exchange for this consumer safeguard, agreements could
build in a corresponding protection for providers against
dramatic falls in house prices. Just as products would be
prevented from becoming too expensive, they could also be
prevented from becoming too cheap. We recommend that the
insurance industry, government and financial intermediaries
work further on this idea by testing and simulating a range of
scenarios to ensure that the design of the product is fair to both
individuals and providers.
Such a product could work in conjunction with the policy
incentives discussed in chapter 4, or in the absence of them. The
key advantage to the consumer would be peace of mind because
a known amount or percentage of their assets would be fully
protected, and all means testing for eligibility to state support
would be avoided. The advantage to the taxpayer is that more
people would be taken out of state support altogether and
personal inheritance planning would be simplified.
Figures 11 and 12 demonstrate how the idea could work, by
addressing how the product would respond to different
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contingencies. Figure 11 shows what would be likely to be the
more expensive option for the consumer, in which the provider
recoups an agreed percentage or amount of housing equity when
the individual dies. Figure 12 looks at what would be likely to be
the cheaper option, under which the provider would recoup an
agreed percentage or amount of housing equity at the moment
the individual enters residential care. This second option would
be likely to be cheaper than the first because the provider of the
product could expect to recoup their money at an earlier stage.
As a rule, anything likely to delay the provider from
recouping their fee – the agreed percentage of the consumer’s
housing equity – would be likely to make products drawing on
this outline idea more expensive. This explains why such
products would be likely to be more expensive for those living
with a dependant, which would delay the sale of the house, than
for those living alone. For example, if an individual dies without
needing care and their house is empty, their house would be sold
within 12 months and the agreed percentage recouped. By
contrast, if a dependant is living in the house, it would not be
sold until the dependant moved out.
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Table 6 A comparison of the Government deferred payment
scheme with our outline product
Government deferred payment Ring-fenced product parameters 
scheme
Agreement made when individual Agreement made in advance of care 
enters residential care needs and costs
Covers costs for residential care Covers costs of domiciliary or 
only residential care 
Costs recouped: actual care costs Costs recouped: agreed percentage
up to social care + interest of housing equity
Costs recouped by local authority Costs recouped by provider either 
on death on death or on entering residential 
care
New products: drawing on housing wealth
Figure 11 Equity recouped by the provider when the consumer dies
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Figure 12 Equity recouped by the provider when the consumer
enters residential care
Demand-side barriers
Any products that are ring-fenced, as discussed in the previous
section, are likely to experience some demand-side barriers, one
of which might be a tendency for people to consider that they
will not experience care costs up to the level of the social care
cap and therefore risk taking no financial precautions to meet
their potential care needs. An inevitable feature of the proposed
ring-fenced products is that some people may end up losing
more in equity than they would have paid in care costs if they
had not bought the product. This is in the nature of insurance.
The danger is always that the protection will not be needed in
practice, but this risk is traded off by the consumer for security
and peace of mind.
A second demand-side barrier might be the fear that in
ring-fencing a fixed percentage of housing equity, consumers
would fear that products engineered along these lines might
become too expensive should house prices rise quickly. This fear
could be addressed through some of the safeguards described
earlier in the chapter, for example, capping how expensive (or
cheap) a product could become over time.
Further, it should be noted that committing a percentage of
equity could be advantageous for consumers as a useful way for
individuals to hedge against fluctuations in house prices. This
can be understood by considering two possible scenarios:
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· Scenario 1: rising house prices would make the product more
expensive overall, as the agreed percentage would be worth a
higher amount than if they had remained level, but this would be
in the context of the individual gaining overall from an
appreciating asset. A more expensive product would be offset by
the house itself being more valuable.
· Scenario 2: house prices fall, so consumers suffer from their asset
declining in value. However, some of this decline in value is
offset by a cheaper deal with the provider, because the
percentage of ring-fenced equity is now worth less than in
scenario 1. If house prices fall, the product becomes cheaper.
One demand-side barrier the product would not suffer
from is too much complexity because it avoids the use of
compound interest, in favour of paying the provider through the
ring-fence mechanism. People could be offered a deal in simple
terms – for example,
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If your house rises in value by A relative to care costs then the product would
cost B. If your house falls in value by X relative to care costs then the product
would cost Y.
This simplifies the product significantly and prevents the
problem of interest gathering exponentially over a long period of
time. Such features ought to help overcome some of the demand-
side barriers that equity release products can suffer from.
Supply-side barriers
Any products engineered along these lines would need to
overcome some significant supply-side barriers as well as the
demand-side barriers. The most important of these would be the
challenge of pricing insurance up to the level of the care cap
because of uncertainty surrounding several of the variables
involved in the calculation. These include the rate at which the
cap would rise over time and the precise way in which the
Government ‘meter’ would count care costs up to the cap.
Unless providers have a straightforward way of predicting these
things, it will always be difficult for a vibrant insurance market
to emerge that includes products of this kind.
The Government has already taken some steps to address
these sources of uncertainty. For example, the Care and Support
Bill sets out the Government’s intention to up-rate the care cap
each year in line with the cost of inflation. This provides one
benchmark for industry to work with, at least within the life of a
parliament. It is not clear whether a degree of cross-party
consensus can be reached that goes beyond this relatively short
timeframe, which would allow individuals and consumers to
make investments in the future with some certainty.
Another step taken by the Government to provide a greater
degree of certainty on metered care costs is the move towards a
national approach to determining what care costs are eligible for
state support and which are not. The Care Bill sets out how the
current eligibility framework will be replaced by a single set of
criteria to describe a minimum threshold for eligible needs of
those requiring care, and a single set of criteria for carers.74
Further analysis
Our initial simulations of the proposed ring-fenced product
using different assumptions about care cost and house price
inflation (HPI) show that only relatively modest amounts of
equity would need to be ring-fenced. For example, assuming 
care cap inflation of 3 per cent per annum and HPI of 4 per 
cent per annum, the amount of equity that would need to be
ring-fenced on an average home worth £200,000 is 3 per cent
(less with a percentage cap discount). Note that it is the
difference between two inflation rates which is important and
not the rates themselves.
Here is an example based on the over-simplified
assumption that 30 per cent of people would need care for two
years at the end of life and face care costs of £12,000 per annum
before inflation. If the ring-fenced product is purchased at age 65
when the cap is £72,000 and care is triggered in 20 years time,
the house would then be worth £432,000 and the care cap
£131,000 at that point. The maximum exposure to the consumer
(or to his estate) would therefore be £13,000 in this example (3
per cent of £432,000) to be set against a potential loss of up to
the £131,000 cap if care is needed (all numbers rounded).
Obviously there would be a responsibility on providers to make
accurate forecasts of inflation rates and on government to ensure
they do not diverge unduly, and this may or may not be viable in
practice. In addition to the consumer safeguards discussed
earlier in this chapter, limits could be put on the permissible drift
in care cost and HPI compared with the date of the policy
agreement to ensure the out-turn is not too detrimental to either
party. More explanation is given in appendix 2.
We recommend that the Government continue to work
with providers to explore whether these steps will be enough to
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allow industry to offer consumers to insure themselves against
care costs up to the level of the cap. A fundamental aspiration of
the Dilnot report and subsequent reforms was that a care cap
would provide a fee for people to insure against. Should this not
yet be the case – as some providers have suggested – the answer
should not be to give up on the idea but to explore ways in
which remaining barriers can be overcome. Succeeding in this
kind of work is technical in nature. but in fact holds the key to a
system under which individuals might be able to secure peace of
mind about care costs in the future
Recommendation 4
Government should continue to work with providers to address
supply-side barriers to new products, which would allow
industry to offer insurance against care costs up to the level of
the cap.
Chapter summary
Ministers have challenged industry to come forward with new
products. The SHIP standards already provide a set of
guarantees that products should provide, beyond the regulatory
rules set by the Financial Conduct Authority. Following
engagement with various stakeholders in this debate, we have
established further features of products, which we believe would
contribute towards helping people plan for the costs of social
care. These features are that the product would enable forward
planning, covering domiciliary care, offering a simple deal and
providing value for money.
We set out the parameters of a ring-fenced product above
for illustration and further exploration by providers. The
product would be like a private sector version of the
Government’s deferred payment scheme. Under the kind of
product that we envisage individuals would ring-fence an agreed
amount, or percentage, of housing equity in a deal with a
provider, in exchange for that provider covering social care costs
up to the care cap. This ring-fenced equity would then be
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recouped either at the point the individual enters residential
care, or on death. Providers may want to explore the viability of
this product further, while government should ensure that policy
does all it can to minimise supply-side barriers in the market-
place.
Conclusion
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After the most significant reforms to social care funding in living
memory, there is a temptation for policy makers to believe the
mission accomplished. When the provisions in the Care and
Support Bill become law, for the first time the Government will
have succeeded in establishing a cap on the lifetime costs of care
in Britain. Many hope that this will create the conditions for a
new market in long-term care products to flourish. This report
has sought to show that such a view would be too simplistic. The
care cap is a necessary condition for such a market to emerge but
almost certainly not a sufficient one. Not only are there supply-
side problems to address, such as whether people’s liability for
up to £72,000 is an insurable risk, but there are considerable
demand-side barriers to overcome.
Chapter 1 discusses the first barrier to creating the con-
ditions for a new market in long-term care products to flourish:
people know very little about the social care system, tend to
underestimate both the risk and the costs of care, and are likely
to have made very little preparation for them as result. For this
reason, the Government should go further than implementing a
traditional information campaign. To overcome people’s lack of
awareness, innate optimism and characteristic inertia, the
Government should require all individuals to go through an
online financial health check as a condition of their first with-
drawal of the state pension. This health check would be a light-
touch, cost-effective ‘nudge’ to encourage forward planning for
the costs of social care. Should there be appetite for a more
comprehensive and personalised assessment, the Government
should consult on how best to cover its costs.
Prompting people to stop to consider the likely costs of
social care is a first step towards achieving a culture of more
responsible forward planning; the next hurdle to overcome is to
ensure that people are able to assess their options in a
straightforward way. Chapter 2 demonstrates that the complexity
of the proposed means test, based on the Dilnot model, militates
against this. The different thresholds and ‘cliff edges’ in the
system make decision-making much more complex than it needs
to be and risks creating inertia rather than overcoming it. A
simpler means test is needed: we propose a formula that does not
give special treatment to either income or assets and eliminates
the complexity in the Government’s proposed model.
While forward planning ought to be a virtue, there is a risk
that savvy individuals will decide that they are happy to let the
Government pay for their care and deliberately run down their
assets. This is the risk that the Government already
acknowledges under the existing system, which includes a means
test. This is likely to continue when the new arrangements come
into force. Moral hazard is an almost inevitable consequence of
means testing, but the Government should explore ways in
which it might encourage and reward those willing to cover the
costs of their own care, up to the level of the cap.
Chapter 3 presents two options for further exploration,
both of which centre on rewarding people who are willing 
to pre-commit portions of their wealth to funding social care
costs in later life either in the form of savings or as insurance. 
In return, people would receive financial benefits if they go 
into care or, as with insurance, peace of mind that their care 
costs will be covered.
The aspiration to encourage more self-funding raises the
question of where people will find the money. Chapter 4
demonstrates that most people are unlikely to do so from
pensions, given the decline in value of the state pension and the
relatively low savings rates in defined contribution schemes.
Many will need to turn to housing wealth, which is a decisive
factor in determining how many years of care people are likely to
be able to afford. Some of this group will choose to release
equity through downsizing, though a majority say they would
prefer not to move home. Equity release is likely to enable those
wishing to remain in their houses to pay for their care. Local
authority deferred payment schemes offer one means of doing
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this, but they are restricted to funding residential care and not
designed to facilitate forward planning, early intervention and
the funding of domiciliary care. This presents an opportunity for
the private sector to step in.
Traditionally, equity release products are designed to
unlock housing wealth at times when people require extra
money, but the creation of a social care cap presents the
opportunity for new types of products to be introduced that are
more geared to forward planning for social care costs. Such
products should conform to the SHIP standards, established by
the Equity Release Council, and fulfil a number of other criteria,
including enabling forward planning, covering domiciliary care,
offering a simple deal and providing value for money. Chapter 5
presents the parameters of one possible product that would fulfil
these criteria. It would be a complementary alternative to the
Government’s deferred payment scheme, in which providers
agree to cover care costs up to the level of the cap, in exchange
for an agreed proportion of people’s housing equity.
Taken together, these recommendations add up to what we
believe to be a more complete agenda for social care funding,
involving contributions from the Government, the private sector
and individuals themselves. We believe they are based on a more
accurate understanding of human behaviour, which recognises
the behavioural quirks that can often confound policy makers
and the importance of encouraging and rewarding personal
responsibility. In this way our ideas are designed to build on a set
of reforms that have been long awaited, but which hold out the
potential for a fairer, more effective system in the future.
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Appendix 1 Formula for the
simplified means test
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The number of years a person could notionally afford to pay for
their care is given by:
years afforded = savings/(£25,000 income)
In which £25,000 is the assumed annual care tariff. Under
the simplified means test the amount of support a person
receives is given by:
(1 × 0.2 × years afforded) × £25,000
The factor 0.2 is called the taper, whose value is between 0
and 1. The lower the taper the more state support is provided.
So the amount a person must pay is £25,000 × 0.2 × years
afforded.
It follows that anyone with income above £25,000 per
annum is a ‘self-funder’.

Appendix 2 Insurance-for-
equity product
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The example of a possible ring-fenced product given in chapter 5
is actuarially based but involves several important simplifying
assumptions. These are that a fixed percentage of the population
will spend a fixed amount of time in residential care at the end of
their lives and that calculations of the required premium are
underpinned by a joint male and female life table for England
and Wales. A more sophisticated version of the model would
include a range of actual probabilities for the time spent in care
and include provision for care costs to change over time. The
following example is therefore only by way of illustration.
The example quoted in chapter 5 assumes 30 per cent of
people aged 65 will need care for two years at the end of their
lives. Their house is initially valued at £200,000 at the time of
the policy, the care cost cap is £72,000 and annual care costs are
assumed to be £12,000. House price inflation (HPI) is assumed
to be 4 per cent and care cost inflation as measured by the retail
price inflation (RPI) is 3 per cent; care cover at the point of
taking out a policy would be about 3 per cent of housing equity
in this case. If the HPI and RPI are as predicted then the value
of the home when it is sold will be £432,000 and the cap
£131,000. The cost of the premium would then be 0.3 times the
present house value in this case (0.3 × £432,000 = £13,000)
The percentage of equity released depends on the future
expected difference in HPI and RPI. Table 7 gives examples and
includes cases where care cost inflation is greater than HPI and
vice versa. As is seen the percentage of equity required decreases
the higher HPI is expected to be above care cost inflation.
These examples are based on the assumption that HPI and
RPI are as predicted at the time when care is actually triggered,
in this example in 20 years time. The amount by which the
expected and actual premium diverges will determine how much
is due when the premium is actually paid. For example, if the
actual rate of HPI rises quicker than expected and diverges 
by 2 per cent per annum the premium would be £19,000 
but the home would be worth more; if they diverge 2 per 
cent per annum in the other direction the premium would be
worth £9,000 but the home would be worth less. Exceptional
losses in either direction could be limited by including a cap 
on the permissible divergence in rates between the start and 
end of the policy.
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Table 7 Examples of the equity on expected future annual
differences in HPI and RPI
Expected future Equity (%)
annual difference in 
HPI and RPI (%)
–1 4.3
–0.5 3.9
0 3.5
0.5 3.2
1 2.9
1.5 2.6
2 2.4
2.5 2.2
3 2.0
Appendix 3 Glossary of
terms
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Care cap A care cap is a limit on the amount that any individual is
expected to pay towards their eligible care needs, before the state
steps in to pay those costs. It includes the costs of care received
either at home or living in a care home and is designed to protect
people from catastrophic costs.
Care meter The means by which eligible care costs are monitored
and counted towards the care cap.
Disregard A disregard is an amount of money that is ignored for
the purposes of determining the level of state support in the
means test. It has the effect of reducing out of pocket costs,
limits the depletion of assets and potentially increases the level of
state support. A disregard can apply to assets (eg a ring-fenced
savings product, or the value of a home) or to income (eg
exempted income from a kite-marked social care savings product
such as a disability linked annuity, or certain welfare benefits).
Tariff A tariff is a reference sum of money based on the cost of
providing care to an individual with eligible assessed care needs.
It includes a care cost and a living cost component. In instances
where assessed living costs are covered exactly by an individual’s
income the years of care afforded in the proposed means test
formula is simplified to be a person’s assets divided by the
annual assessed cost of care.

Notes
97
1 Professor in the Faculty of Actuarial Science and Insurance, at
Cass Business School, City University London.
2 Interview with David Cameron on The Andrew Marr Show, 6 Jan
2013, transcript available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/
bsp/hi/pdfs/060113.pdf (accessed 11 Feb 2014).
3 Equity Release Research Centre, ‘Research’, nd,
www.erresearchcentre.org/research/ (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
4 K Walker, ‘Labour’s “secret plan for a 10% death tax” raid on the
estates of Middle Britain to fund social care for the elderly’, Daily
Mail, 15 Feb 2010, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1251067/
Labours-secret-plan-10-death-tax.html (accessed 18 Feb 2014).
5 A Dilnot (chair), Fairer Care Funding: The report of the Commission
on Funding of Care and Support, 2011, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130221130239/https://www.wp.
dh.gov.uk/carecommission/files/2011/07/Fairer-Care-Funding-
Report.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
6 DoH, ‘New fairer capped funding system to help everyone plan
for the cost of care’, Dept of Health, press release 18 Jul 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-fairer-capped-
funding-system-to-help-everyone-plan-for-the-cost-of-care
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
7 DoH, Caring for our Future: Consultation on reforming what and how
people pay for their care and support, Dept of Health, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/239393/CONSULTATION_CaringForOurFut
ure_acc.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
8 CSJ, ‘Dilnot reforms are “wrong priority at the wrong time”, 
CSJ says’, Centre for Social Justice, [2013],
www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/
thecentreforsocialjustice.createsend5.pdf (accessed 
12 Feb 2014).
9 Dilnot, Fairer Care Funding.
10 ‘Andrew Dilnot: “Social care cap higher than we wanted”’, BBC
News, 11 Feb 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-21408949
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
11 BD Rickayzen and DEP Walsh, ‘A multi-state model of disability
for the United Kingdom: implications for future need for long-
term care for the elderly’, British Actuarial Journal 8, issue 2,
2002, pp 341–93.
12 DoH, ‘Social care funding reform impact assessment’, Dept of
Health, 8 Apr 2014, www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-
assessments/IA13-14C.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
13 DoH, ‘Policy statement on care and support funding reform’,
Dept of Health, press release, 11 Feb 2013, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/policy-statement-on-care-and-support-
funding-reform (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
14 Interview with David Cameron on The Andrew Marr Show.
15 ABI, Developing Products for Social Care, Pensions and Insurance
Working Group, Association of British Insurers, 2014,
https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/
Public/2014/Social%20care/Developing%20Products%20for
%20Social%20Care%20Report.ashx (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
16 DoH, ‘Social care funding reform impact assessment’.
17 Age UK, ‘The “Dilnot social care cap”: making sure it delivers
for old people’, 2013, www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-
GB/Press per cent.20releases/Implementing per cent.20the per
Notes
cent.20Dilnot per cent.20social per cent.20care per
cent.20cap.pdf?dtrk=true (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
18 DoH, Caring For Our Future.
19 Ipsos MORI, Public Perceptions of the NHS and Social Care: An
ongoing tracking study conducted for the Department of Health,
December 2012 wave, Jun 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/259531/public-
perceptions-nhs-social-care-ipsos-mori-2012.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
20 K Grant, ‘Public “unaware” of care-home costs – and of
probability they will need care themselves’, Independent, 16 Sep
2013, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/public-
unaware-of-carehome-costs—and-of-probability-they-will-need-
care-themselves-8818204.html (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
21 J Lloyd, Right Care, Right Price: A discussion paper exploring the way
in which the price of care is determined and its implications for social
care policy, Strategic Society Centre, Sep 2013,
www.anchor.org.uk/sites/default/files/news_articles/documents
/Anchor-Right-Care-Right-Price-Report-Sept-2013.pdf (accessed
12 Feb 2014).
22 SAGA, ‘91% of over 50s don’t understand the care cap’, press
release, 9 Jul 2013, https://www.saga.co.uk/newsroom/press-
releases/2013/july/91percent-do-no-understand-care-cap.aspx
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
23 ABI, Developing Products for Social Care.
24 R Thaler and C Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health,
wealth and happiness, Penguin, 2009.
25 Cabinet Office, ‘Organ donor registrations: trialling different
approaches’, Behavioural Insights Team, Cabinet Office, 24 Dec
2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
behavioural-insights-team (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
99
26 T Sharot, The Optimism Bias: Why we are wired to look on the bright
side, Robinson, 2012.
27 LA Baker and RF Emery, ‘When every relationship is above
average’, Law and Human Behaviour 17, no 4 1993, www.uvm.edu/
~lrodd/psyc_130/baker_emery.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
28 HM Treasury, ‘Optimism bias: supplementary Green Book
guidance’, [2013], https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191507/Optimism_
bias.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
29 Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
30 Organ Donation Taskforce, The Potential Impact of an Opt Out
System for Organ Donation in the UK, 2008, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http:/www.dh.gov.uk/
en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicy
AndGuidance/DH_090312 (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
31 OFT, What Does Behavioural Economics Mean for Competition
Policy?, Office for Fair Trading, 2010, www.oft.gov.uk/
shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
32 ‘Universal over-40s health checks’, BBC News Online, 29 Mar
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7968734.stm (accessed
18 Feb 2014).
33 ‘Free health checks could save lives, Jeremy Hunt says’, BBC
News, 21 Jul 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-23394314
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
34 Money Advice Service, ‘Money Health Check’, nd,
https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/tools/health-check
(accessed 18 Feb 2014).
Notes
35 For example, income imputed from assets are equal to £1 for each
£250 per of capital above the lower limit (see figure 1).
Depending on how people’s wealth is divided between income
and assets, this rate can have a significant effect on the state
support individuals are entitled to.
36 Age UK, ‘The “Dilnot social care cap”’.
37 See English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA),
www.ifs.org.uk/ELSA (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
38 The taper used is 0.2, though this could be adjusted.
39 C Horlick, ‘Long term care: “the real cap will be £200,000, not
£75,000”’, Daily Telegraph, 8 Jan 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/personalfinance/comment/9786231/Long-term-care-The-
real-cap-will-be-200000-not-75000.html (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
40 Dilnot, Fairer Care Funding.
41 L Donnelly, ‘Record numbers of care homes warned over
illegally poor standards’, Daily Telegraph, 19 Aug 2013,
www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10252991/Record-
numbers-of-care-homes-warned-over-illegally-poor-
standards.html (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
42 Ibid.
43 ‘Boring, isolated and lonely: Britain’s damaging perceptions of
our care homes’, Demos, press release, 15 Nov 2013, www.demos.
co.uk/press_releases/boringisolatedandlonelybritainsdamaging
perceptionsofourcarehomes (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
44 Quoted in Donnelly, ‘Record numbers of care homes warned
over illegally poor standards’.
45 Dilnot, Fairer Care Funding.
46 Ibid.
101
47 DoH, ‘Policy statement on care and support funding reform’.
48 ABI, Developing Products for Social Care.
49 DoH, ‘Policy statement on care and support funding reform’.
50 Age UK, ‘Deprivation of assets in the means test for care home
provision’, factsheet, Apr 2013, www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/
EN-GB/Factsheets/FS40_deprivation_of_assets_in_the_
means_test_for_care_home_provision_fcs.pdf?dtrk=true
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
51 DoH, Charging For Residential Accommodation Guide (CRAG), Dept
of Health, Apr 2013, www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/charging-for-
residential-accommodation-guide-2013.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
52 Just Retirement, The Role of Housing Equity in Retirement Planning,
2012, www.erresearchcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
The-role-of-housing-equity-in-retirement-planning.pdf (accessed
12 Feb 2014).
53 R Thaler, ‘Mental accounting matters’, Journal of Behavioural
Decision Making 12, pp 183–206, 1999, http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/
MentalAccounting.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
54 DWP Credit Union Expansion Project, Feasibility Study Report,
Dept for Work & Pensions, 2012, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130102224139/www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/
credit-union-feasibility-study-report.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
55 P Heidhues and B K?szegi, The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion
on Pricing, 2005, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~botond/pricing.pdf
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
56 RG Fryer et al, ‘Enhancing the efficacy of teacher incentives
through loss aversion: a field experiment’, 2011,
Notes
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/meritpaychihgtsall_1.
pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
57 Aon Consulting, European Pensions Barometer Report, 2007.
58 ONS, Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2010, Office for
National Statistics, 2011, cited in Just Retirement, The Role of
Housing Equity in Retirement Planning.
59 Just Retirement, The Role of Housing Equity in Retirement Planning.
60 B Barrow, ‘Bank of England warns house prices and mortgage
crackdown will shut first time buyers from the property market’,
This is Money, 20 Mar 2012, www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/
mortgageshome/article-2117476/Banks-Miles-warns-time-buyers-
shut-property-market.html (accessed 18 Feb 2014).
61 Office for National Statistics, House Price Index, 2012,
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/hpi/house-price-index/index.html
(accessed 18 Feb 2014) and ONS, Consumer Price Indices, 2012,
www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Consumer+
Price+Indices (accessed 18 Feb 2014).
62 L Mayhew and D Smith, Personal Care Savings Bonds: A new way of
paying for care in later life, International Longevity Centre, 2013,
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_
details/personal_care_savings_bonds_a_new_way_of_saving
_towards_social_care_in_late (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
63 An immediate needs annuity is for a person already in residential
care, or a nursing home, or is about to be admitted and is paid to
the care provider for the life of the individual.
64 Just Retirement, The Role of Housing Equity in Retirement Planning.
65 Ibid.
66 C Wood, The Top of the Ladder, London: Demos, 2013.
103
67 Ibid.
68 L Mayhew, M Karlsson and B Rickayzen, ‘The role of private
finance in paying for long term care’, Economic Journal 120, issue
548, pp F478–504, Nov2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02388.x/pdf (accessed 18 Feb 2014).
69 Ibid.
70 Just Retirement, The Role of Housing Equity in Retirement Planning.
71 C Tornsey, ‘Quick-sale property firms could cost you thousands’,
Confused.com, 5 Oct2012, http://www.confused.com/
mortgages/articles/quick-sale-property-firms-could-cost-
homeowners-thousands-of-pounds (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
72 Equity Release Council, ‘What is equity release?’, nd,
www.equityreleasecouncil.com/what-is-equity-release/ (accessed
12 Feb 2014).
73 Equity Release Council, ‘Code of conduct’, nd,
www.equityreleasecouncil.com/ship-standards/code-of-conduct/
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
74 SCIE, ‘Fair access to care services (FACS): prioritising eligibility
for care and support’, nd, Social Care Institute for Excellence,
www.scie.org.uk/publications/guides/guide33/changing-
scene/eligibility-criteria.asp (accessed 12 Feb 2014); DoH, ‘Draft
national minimum eligibility threshold for adult care and
support: a discussion document’, Dept of Health, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/209595/National_Eligibility_Criteria_-
_discussion_document.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Notes
References
105
‘Andrew Dilnot: “Social care cap higher than we wanted”’, BBC
News, 11 Feb 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-21408949
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
‘Boring, isolated and lonely: Britain’s damaging perceptions of
our care homes’, Demos, press release, 15 Nov 2013,
www.demos.co.uk/press_releases/boringisolatedandlonelybritai
nsdamagingperceptionsofourcarehomes (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
‘Free health checks could save lives, Jeremy Hunt says’, BBC
News, 21 Jul 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-23394314
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
‘Universal over-40s health checks’, BBC News Online, 29 Mar
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7968734.stm (accessed
18 Feb 2014).
ABI, Developing Products for Social Care, Pensions and Insurance
Working Group, Association of British Insurers, 2014,
https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/
Public/2014/Social%20care/Developing%20Products%20for
%20Social%20Care%20Report.ashx (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Age UK, ‘Deprivation of assets in the means test for care home
provision’, factsheet, Apr 2013, www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/
EN-GB/Factsheets/FS40_deprivation_of_assets_in_the_
means_test_for_care_home_provision_fcs.pdf?dtrk=true
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Age UK, ‘The “Dilnot social care cap”: making sure it delivers
for old people’, 2013, www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-
GB/Press per cent.20releases/Implementing per cent.20the per
cent.20Dilnot per cent.20social per cent.20care per
cent.20cap.pdf?dtrk=true (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Aon Consulting, European Pensions Barometer Report, 2007.
Baker LA and Emery RF, ‘When every relationship is above
average’, Law and Human Behaviour 17, no 4 1993, www.uvm.edu/
~lrodd/psyc_130/baker_emery.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Barrow B, ‘Bank of England warns house prices and mortgage
crackdown will shut first time buyers from the property market’,
This is Money, 20 Mar 2012, www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/
mortgageshome/article-2117476/Banks-Miles-warns-time-buyers-
shut-property-market.html
Cabinet Office, ‘Organ donor registrations: trialling different
approaches’, Behavioural Insights Team, Cabinet Office, 24 Dec
2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
behavioural-insights-team (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
CSJ, ‘Dilnot reforms are “wrong priority at the wrong time”, CSJ
says’, Centre for Social Justice, [2013], www.centreforsocial
justice.org.uk/UserStorage/pdf/thecentreforsocialjustice.
createsend5.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Dilnot A (chair), Fairer Care Funding: The report of the Commission
on Funding of Care and Support, 2011, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130221130239/https://
www.wp.dh.gov.uk/carecommission/files/2011/07/Fairer-Care-
Funding-Report.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
DoH, ‘Draft national minimum eligibility threshold for adult
care and support: a discussion document’, Dept of Health, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
References
attachment_data/file/209595/National_Eligibility_Criteria_-
_discussion_document.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
DoH, ‘New fairer capped funding system to help everyone plan
for the cost of care’, Dept of Health, press release 18 Jul 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-fairer-capped-
funding-system-to-help-everyone-plan-for-the-cost-of-care
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
DoH, ‘Policy statement on care and support funding reform’,
Dept of Health, press release, 11 Feb 2013, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/policy-statement-on-care-and-support-
funding-reform (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
DoH, ‘Social care funding reform impact assessment’, Dept of
Health, 8 Apr 2014, www.parliament.uk/documents/impact-
assessments/IA13-14C.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
DoH, Caring for our Future: Consultation on reforming what and how
people pay for their care and support, Dept of Health, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/239393/CONSULTATION_
CaringForOurFuture_acc.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
DoH, Charging For Residential Accommodation Guide (CRAG), Dept
of Health, Apr 2013, www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/charging-for-
residential-accommodation-guide-2013.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
Donnelly L, ‘Record numbers of care homes warned over
illegally poor standards’, Daily Telegraph, 19 Aug 2013,
www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10252991/Record-
numbers-of-care-homes-warned-over-illegally-poor-
standards.html (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
107
DWP Credit Union Expansion Project, Feasibility Study Report,
Dept for Work & Pensions, 2012, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130102224139/www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/
credit-union-feasibility-study-report.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), www.ifs.org.uk/
ELSA (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Equity Release Council, ‘Code of conduct’, nd,
www.equityreleasecouncil.com/ship-standards/code-of-conduct/
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Equity Release Council, ‘What is equity release?’, nd,
www.equityreleasecouncil.com/what-is-equity-release/ (accessed
12 Feb 2014).
Equity Release Research Centre, ‘Research’, nd,
www.erresearchcentre.org/research/ (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Fryer RG et al, ‘Enhancing the efficacy of teacher incentives
through loss aversion: a field experiment’, 2011, http://scholar.
harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/meritpaychihgtsall_1.pdf (accessed
12 Feb 2014).
Grant K, ‘Public “unaware” of care-home costs – and of
probability they will need care themselves’, Independent, 16 Sep
2013, www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/public-
unaware-of-carehome-costs—and-of-probability-they-will-need-
care-themselves-8818204.html (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Heidhues P and K?szegi B, The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion
on Pricing, 2005, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~botond/pricing.pdf
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
HM Treasury, ‘Optimism bias: supplementary Green Book
guidance’, [2013], https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191507/Optimism_bias.p
df (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
References
Horlick C, ‘Long term care: “the real cap will be £200,000, not
£75,000”’, Daily Telegraph, 8 Jan 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/personalfinance/comment/9786231/Long-term-care-The-
real-cap-will-be-200000-not-75000.html (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Ipsos MORI, Public Perceptions of the NHS and Social Care: An
ongoing tracking study conducted for the Department of Health,
December 2012 wave, Jun 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/259531/public-
perceptions-nhs-social-care-ipsos-mori-2012.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
Just Retirement, The Role of Housing Equity in Retirement Planning,
2012, www.erresearchcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
The-role-of-housing-equity-in-retirement-planning.pdf (accessed
12 Feb 2014).
Lloyd J, Right Care, Right Price: A discussion paper exploring the way
in which the price of care is determined and its implications for social
care policy, Strategic Society Centre, Sep 2013, www.anchor.
org.uk/sites/default/files/news_articles/documents/Anchor-
Right-Care-Right-Price-Report-Sept-2013.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
Mayhew L and Smith D, Personal Care Savings Bonds: A new way of
paying for care in later life, International Longevity Centre, 2013,
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/index.php/publications/publication_
details/personal_care_savings_bonds_a_new_way_of_saving
_towards_social_care_in_late (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Mayhew L, Karlsson M and Rickayzen B, ‘The role of private
finance in paying for long term Care’, Economic Journal 120, issue
548, pp F478–504, Nov2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02388.x/pdf (accessed 18 Feb
2014).
109
Money Advice Service, ‘Money Health Check’, nd,
https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/tools/health-check
(accessed 18 Feb 2014).
OFT, What Does Behavioural Economics Mean for Competition
Policy?, Office for Fair Trading, 2010, www.oft.gov.uk/
shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf (accessed 12 Feb
2014).
ONS, Occupational Pension Schemes Survey 2010, Office for
National Statistics, 2011, cited in Just Retirement, The Role of
Housing Equity in Retirement Planning.
Organ Donation Taskforce, The Potential Impact of an Opt Out
System for Organ Donation in the UK, 2008, http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http:/www.dh.gov.uk/
en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicy
AndGuidance/DH_090312 (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Rickayzen BD and Walsh DEP, ‘A multi-state model of disability
for the United Kingdom: implications for future need for long-
term care for the elderly’, British Actuarial Journal 8, issue 2,
2002, pp 341–93.
SAGA, ‘91% of over 50s don’t understand the care cap’, press
release, 9 Jul 2013, https://www.saga.co.uk/newsroom/press-
releases/2013/july/91percent-do-no-understand-care-cap.aspx
(accessed 12 Feb 2014).
SCIE, ‘Fair access to care services (FACS): prioritising eligibility
for care and support’, nd, Social Care Institute for Excellence,
www.scie.org.uk/publications/guides/guide33/changing-
scene/eligibility-criteria.asp (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Sharot T, The Optimism Bias: Why we are wired to look on the bright
side, Robinson, 2012.
References
Thaler R, ‘Mental accounting matters’, Journal of Behavioural
Decision Making 12, pp 183–206, 1999, http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/richard.thaler/research/pdf/MentalAccounting.p
df (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Thaler R and Sunstein C, Nudge: Improving decisions about health,
wealth and happiness, Penguin, 2009.
Tornsey C, ‘Quick-sale property firms could cost you thousands’,
Confused.com, 5 Oct2012, http://www.confused.com/
mortgages/articles/quick-sale-property-firms-could-cost-
homeowners-thousands-of-pounds (accessed 12 Feb 2014).
Walker K, ‘Labour’s “secret plan for a 10% death tax” raid on the
estates of Middle Britain to fund social care for the elderly’, Daily
Mail, 15 Feb 2010, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1251067/
Labours-secret-plan-10-death-tax.html (accessed 18 Feb 2014).
Wood C, The Top of the Ladder, London: Demos, 2013.
111
Demos – Licence to Publish
The work (as defined below) is provided under the terms of this licence (‘licence’). The work is
protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as
authorised under this licence is prohibited. By exercising any rights to the work provided here,
you accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this licence. Demos grants you the rights
contained here in consideration of your acceptance of such terms and conditions.
1 Definitions
A ‘Collective Work’ means a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology or encyclopedia, in
which the Work in its entirety in unmodified form, along with a number of other contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective
whole. A work that constitutes a Collective Work will not be considered a Derivative Work (as
defined below) for the purposes of this Licence.
B ‘Derivative Work’ means a work based upon the Work or upon the Work and other pre-
existing works, such as a musical arrangement, dramatisation, fictionalisation, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which the Work may be recast, transformed, or adapted, except that a work that constitutes a
Collective Work or a translation from English into another language will not be considered a
Derivative Work for the purpose of this Licence.
C ‘Licensor’ means the individual or entity that offers the Work under the terms of this Licence.
D ‘Original Author’ means the individual or entity who created the Work.
E ‘Work’ means the copyrightable work of authorship offered under the terms of this Licence.
F ‘You’ means an individual or entity exercising rights under this Licence who has not previously
violated the terms of this Licence with respect to the Work, or who has received express
permission from Demos to exercise rights under this Licence despite a previous violation.
2 Fair Use Rights
Nothing in this licence is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use,
first sale or other limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under copyright
law or other applicable laws.
3 Licence Grant
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Licence, Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide,
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) licence to
exercise the rights in the Work as stated below: 
A to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, and to
reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works;
B to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly, perform publicly, and perform
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as incorporated in
Collective Works; The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now
known or hereafter devised. The above rights include the right to make such modifications as
are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. All rights not
expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved.
4 Restrictions
The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited by the
following restrictions:
A You may distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work
only under the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the Uniform
Resource Identifier for, this Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You
distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform. You may not offer or
impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms of this Licence or the recipients’
exercise of the rights granted here under. You may not sublicence the Work. You must keep
intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of warranties. You may not
distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work with any
technological measures that control access or use of the Work in a manner inconsistent with
the terms of this Licence Agreement. The above applies to the Work as incorporated in a
Collective Work, but this does not require the Collective Work apart from the Work itself to
be made subject to the terms of this Licence. If You create a Collective Work, upon notice
from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the Collective Work any
reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested.
B You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that
is primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or private monetary
Licence to Publish
compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital
filesharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed towards
commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of
any monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of copyrighted works.
C If you distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work or
any Collective Works, You must keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and give the
Original Author credit reasonable to the medium or means You are utilising by conveying the
name (or pseudonym if applicable) of the Original Author if supplied; the title of the Work if
supplied. Such credit may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that
in the case of a Collective Work, at a minimum such credit will appear where any other
comparable authorship credit appears and in a manner at least as prominent as such other
comparable authorship credit.
5 Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer
A By offering the Work for public release under this Licence, Licensor represents and warrants
that, to the best of Licensor’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry:
i Licensor has secured all rights in the Work necessary to grant the licence rights hereunder
and to permit the lawful exercise of the rights granted hereunder without You having any
obligation to pay any royalties, compulsory licence fees, residuals or any other payments;
ii The Work does not infringe the copyright, trademark, publicity rights, common law rights or
any other right of any third party or constitute defamation, invasion of privacy or other
tortious injury to any third party.
B except as expressly stated in this licence or otherwise agreed in writing or required by
applicable law, the work is licenced on an ‘as is’ basis, without warranties of any kind, either
express or implied including, without limitation, any warranties regarding the contents or
accuracy of the work.
6 Limitation on Liability
Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability
to a third party resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will Licensor
be liable to you on any legal theory for any special, incidental, consequential, punitive or
exemplary damages arising out of this licence or the use of the work, even if Licensor has
been advised of the possibility of such damages.
7 Termination
A This Licence and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach
by You of the terms of this Licence. Individuals or entities who have received Collective
Works from You under this Licence, however, will not have their licences terminated provided
such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with those licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7,
and 8 will survive any termination of this Licence.
B Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the
duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor
reserves the right to release the Work under different licence terms or to stop distributing the
Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw this
Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the terms of
this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated
above.
8 Miscellaneous
A Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos
offers to the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence
granted to You under this Licence.
B If any provision of this Licence is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not
affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this Licence, and without
further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.
C No term or provision of this Licence shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to
unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with
such waiver or consent.
D This Licence constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work
licenced here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to
the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that
may appear in any communication from You. This Licence may not be modified without the
mutual written agreement of Demos and You.
113


2014© Demos 
Social care funding has long been the problem that 
governments refused to confront. An ageing population 
has placed growing strains on the care system, without 
the means to pay for it. In this context, the Care and 
Support Bill, now making its way through Parliament, 
represents a substantial achievement. he reforms 
contained in the bill mark the most signiicant changes 
to social care in a generation, including the irst ever 
cap on the lifetime cost of care.
Unlocking the Potential seeks to build on those 
reforms. It examines how likely the Government is  
to succeed in fostering a new market in long-term 
care products and explores additional policy measures 
to facilitate more forward planning. he fundamental 
argument is that the Care and Support Bill will not  
be enough on its own to produce a step change in the 
way people plan for social care. Policy must also draw 
on behavioural economics to spur people into action.
he report recommends various ways of achieving 
a more complete agenda for social care funding, based 
on a more accurate understanding of human behav-
iour. hese include a inancial ‘health-check’ for  
individuals before they irst withdraw from the state 
pension; a simpliied means test, to make it easier for 
people to determine their eligibility; and ‘care accounts’ 
to provide stronger incentives for planning ahead. 
In so doing, it holds out the potential for a fairer, more 
efective system in the future.
Les Mayhew is Professor in the Faculty of  
Actuarial Science and Insurance at Cass Business 
School, City University. Duncan O’Leary is Deputy 
Director of Demos.
£10ISBN 978-1-909037-54-0
